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DISCLAIMER  
 
This report was prepared as an account of work sponsored by an agency of the 
United States Government.  Neither the United States Government nor any 
agency thereof, nor any of their employees, makes any warranty, express or 
implied, or assumes any legal liability or responsibility for the accuracy, 
completeness, or usefulness of any information, apparatus, product, or process 
disclosed, or represents that its use would not infringe privately owned rights.  
Reference herein to any specific commercial product, process, or service by 
trade name, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise does not necessarily 
constitute or imply its endorsement, recommendation, or favoring by the United 
States Government or any agency thereof.  The views and opinions of authors 
expressed herein do not necessarily state or reflect those of the United States 
Government or any agency thereof. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
The peaking of world oil production presents the U.S. and the world with an 
unprecedented risk management problem. As peaking is approached, liquid fuel 
prices and price volatility will increase dramatically, and, without timely mitigation, 
the economic, social, and political costs will be unprecedented.  Viable mitigation 
options exist on both the supply and demand sides, but to have substantial 
impact, they must be initiated more than a decade in advance of peaking.   
 
In 2003, the world consumed just under 80 million barrels per day (MM bpd) of 
oil.  U.S. consumption was almost 20 MM bpd, two-thirds of which was in the 
transportation sector. The U.S. has a fleet of about 210 million automobiles and 
light trucks (vans, pick-ups, and SUVs). The average age of U.S. automobiles is 
nine years. Under normal conditions, replacement of only half the automobile 
fleet will require 10-15 years.  The average age of light trucks is seven years.  
Under normal conditions, replacement of one-half of the stock of light trucks will 
require 9-14 years.  While significant improvements in fuel efficiency are possible 
in automobiles and light trucks, any affordable approach to upgrading will be 
inherently time-consuming, requiring more than a decade to achieve significant 
overall fuel efficiency improvement.  
 
Besides further oil exploration, there are commercial options for increasing world 
oil supply and for the production of substitute liquid fuels:  1)  Improved Oil 
Recovery (IOR) can marginally increase production from existing reservoirs; one 
of the largest of the IOR opportunities is Enhanced Oil Recovery (EOR), which 
can help moderate oil production declines from reservoirs that are past their peak 
production: 2) Heavy oil / oil sands represents a large resource of lower grade 
oils, now primarily produced in Canada and Venezuela; those resources are 
capable of significant production increases;.  3) Coal liquefaction is a well-
established technique for producing clean substitute fuels from the world’s 
abundant coal reserves; and finally, 4) Clean substitute fuels can be produced 
from remotely located natural gas, but exploitation must compete with the world’s 
growing demand for liquefied natural gas. However, world-scale contributions 
from these options will require 10-20 years of accelerated effort.  
 
Dealing with world oil production peaking will be extremely complex, involve 
literally trillions of dollars and require many years of intense effort.  To explore 
these complexities, three alternative mitigation scenarios were analyzed: 
 
• Scenario I assumed that action is not initiated until peaking occurs.   
• Scenario II assumed that action is initiated 10 years before peaking.  
• Scenario III assumed action is initiated 20 years before peaking.   
 
For this analysis estimates of the possible contributions of each mitigation option 
were developed, based on an assumed crash program rate of implementation. 
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Our approach was simplified in order to provide transparency and promote 
understanding.  Our estimates are approximate, but the mitigation envelope that 
results is believed to be directionally indicative of the realities of such an 
enormous undertaking.  The inescapable conclusion is that more than a decade 
will be required for the collective contributions to produce results that significantly 
impact world supply and demand for liquid fuels.   
 
Important observations and conclusions from this study are as follows: 
 
1. When world oil peaking will occur is not known with certainty. A fundamental 
problem in predicting oil peaking is the poor quality of and possible political 
biases in world oil reserves data. Some experts believe peaking may occur soon.  
This study indicates that “soon” is within 20 years. 
 
2. The problems associated with world oil production peaking will not be 
temporary, and past “energy crisis” experience will provide relatively little 
guidance.   The challenge of oil peaking deserves immediate, serious attention, if 
risks are to be fully understood and mitigation begun on a timely basis. 
 
3.  Oil peaking will create a severe liquid fuels problem for the transportation 
sector, not an “energy crisis” in the usual sense that term has been used.  
 
4.  Peaking will result in dramatically higher oil prices, which will cause protracted 
economic hardship in the United States and the world.  However, the problems 
are not insoluble. Timely, aggressive mitigation initiatives addressing both the 
supply and the demand sides of the issue will be required.   
 
5.  In the developed nations, the problems will be especially serious.  In the 
developing nations peaking problems have the potential to be much worse.  
  
6.  Mitigation will require a minimum of a decade of intense, expensive effort, 
because the scale of liquid fuels mitigation is inherently extremely large.  
 
7.  While greater end-use efficiency is essential, increased efficiency alone will 
be neither sufficient nor timely enough to solve the problem.  Production of large 
amounts of substitute liquid fuels will be required.  A number of commercial or 
near-commercial substitute fuel production technologies are currently available 
for deployment, so the production of vast amounts of substitute liquid fuels is 
feasible with existing technology. 
 
8.  Intervention by governments will be required, because the economic and 
social implications of oil peaking would otherwise be chaotic.  The experiences of 
the 1970s and 1980s offer important guides as to government actions that are 
desirable and those that are undesirable, but the process will not be easy.  
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Mitigating the peaking of world conventional oil production presents a classic risk 
management problem: 
 
• Mitigation initiated earlier than required may turn out to be 
premature, if peaking is long delayed.  
 
• If peaking is imminent, failure to initiate timely mitigation 
could be extremely damaging. 
 
Prudent risk management requires the planning and implementation of mitigation 
well before peaking.  Early mitigation will almost certainly be less expensive than 
delayed mitigation.  A unique aspect of the world oil peaking problem is that its 
timing is uncertain, because of inadequate and potentially biased reserves data 
from elsewhere around the world.  In addition, the onset of peaking may be 
obscured by the volatile nature of oil prices.  Since the potential economic impact 
of peaking is immense and the uncertainties relating to all facets of the problem 
are large, detailed quantitative studies to address the uncertainties and to 
explore mitigation strategies are a critical need. 
 
The purpose of this analysis was to identify the critical issues surrounding the 
occurrence and mitigation of world oil production peaking.  We simplified many of 
the complexities in an effort to provide a transparent analysis.  Nevertheless, our 
study is neither simple nor brief.  We recognize that when oil prices escalate 
dramatically, there will be demand and economic impacts that will alter our 
simplified assumptions.  Consideration of those feedbacks will be a daunting task 
but one that should be undertaken. 
 
Our study required that we make a number of assumptions and estimates.  We 
well recognize that in-depth analyses may yield different numbers.    
Nevertheless, this analysis clearly demonstrates that the key to mitigation of 
world oil production peaking will be the construction a large number of substitute 
fuel production facilities, coupled to significant increases in transportation fuel 
efficiency. The time required to mitigate world oil production peaking is measured 
on a decade time-scale.  Related production facility size is large and capital 
intensive.  How and when governments decide to address these challenges is 
yet to be determined.  
 
Our focus on existing commercial and near-commercial mitigation technologies 
illustrates that a number of technologies are currently ready for immediate and 
extensive implementation. Our analysis was not meant to be limiting.  We believe 
that future research will provide additional mitigation options, some possibly 
superior to those we considered.  Indeed, it would be appropriate to greatly 
accelerate public and private oil peaking mitigation research.  However, the 
reader must recognize that doing the research required to bring new 
technologies to commercial readiness takes time under the best of 
circumstances.  Thereafter, more than a decade of intense implementation will 
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be required for world scale impact, because of the inherently large scale of world 
oil consumption. 
 
In summary, the problem of the peaking of world conventional oil production is 
unlike any yet faced by modern industrial society.  The challenges and 
uncertainties need to be much better understood. Technologies exist to mitigate 
the problem. Timely, aggressive risk management will be essential. 
 
 
 
  8 
I.  INTRODUCTION          
 
Oil is the lifeblood of modern civilization.  It fuels the vast majority of the world’s 
mechanized transportation equipment – Automobiles, trucks, airplanes, trains, 
ships, farm equipment, the military, etc.  Oil is also the primary feedstock for 
many of the chemicals that are essential to modern life. This study deals with the 
upcoming physical shortage of world conventional oil -- an event that has the 
potential to inflict disruptions and hardships on the economies of every country. 
 
The earth’s endowment of oil is finite and demand for oil continues to increase 
with time.  Accordingly, geologists know that at some future date, conventional oil 
supply will no longer be capable of satisfying world demand.  At that point world 
conventional oil production will have peaked and begin to decline.  
 
A number of experts project that world production of conventional oil could occur 
in the relatively near future, as summarized in Table I-1.1  Such projections are 
fraught with uncertainties because of poor data, political and institutional self-
interest, and other complicating factors.  The bottom line is that no one knows 
with certainty when world oil production will reach a peak,2 but geologists have 
no doubt that it will happen. 
 
 
Table I-1.  Predictions of World Oil Production Peaking 
 
   Projected Date  Source of Projection 
 
2006-2007   Bakhitari 
2007-2009   Simmons 
After 2007   Skrebowski 
Before 2009   Deffeyes 
Before 2010   Goodstein 
Around 2010   Campbell 
 
After 2010   World Energy Council 
2010-2020   Laherrere 
2016    EIA (Nominal) 
 
After 2020   CERA 
2025 or later     Shell 
No visible Peak   Lynch 
 
 
 
                                                
1A more detailed list is given in the following chapter in Table II-2. 
2 In this study we interchangeably refer to the peaking of world conventional oil production as “oil 
peaking” or  simply as “peaking.” 
  9 
Our aim in this study is to  
 
• Summarize the difficulties of oil production forecasting; 
 
• Identify the fundamentals that show why world oil production peaking is 
such a unique challenge;  
 
• Show why mitigation will take a decade or more of intense effort; 
 
• Examine the potential economic effects of oil peaking; 
 
• Describe what might be accomplished under three example mitigation 
scenarios.   
 
• Stimulate serious discussion of the problem, suggest more definitive 
studies, and engender interest in timely action to mitigate its impacts. 
 
In Chapter II we describe the basics of oil production, the meaning of world 
conventional oil production peaking, the challenge of making accurate forecasts, 
and the effects that higher prices and advanced technology might have on oil 
production. 
  
Because of the massive scale of oil use around the world, mitigation of oil 
shortages will be difficult, time consuming, and expensive.  In Chapter III we 
describe the extensive and critical uses of U.S. oil and the long economic and 
mechanical lifetimes of existing liquid fuel consuming vehicles and equipment. 
 
While it is impossible to predict the impact of world oil production peaking with 
any certainty, much can be learned from past oil disruptions, particularly the 1973 
oil embargo and the 1979 Iranian oil shortage, as discussed in Chapter IV.  In 
Chapter V we describe the developing shortages of U.S. natural gas, shortages 
that are occurring in spite of assurances of abundant supply provided just a few 
years ago.  The parallels to world oil supply are disconcerting. 
 
In Chapter VI we describe available mitigation options and related 
implementation issues.  We limit our considerations to technologies that are near 
ready or currently commercially available for immediate deployment. Clearly, 
accelerated research and development holds promise for other options. 
However, the challenge related to extensive near-term oil shortages will require 
deployment of currently viable technologies, which is our focus.  
 
Oil is a commodity found in over 90 countries, consumed in all countries, and 
traded on world markets.  To illustrate and bracket the range of mitigation 
options, we developed three illustrative scenarios.  Two assume action well in 
advance of the onset of world oil peaking – in one case, 20 years before peaking 
and in another case, 10 years in advance.  Our third scenario assumes that no 
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action is taken prior to the onset of peaking. Our findings illustrate the  magnitude 
of the problem and the importance of prudent risk management. 
 
Finally, we touch on possible market signals that might foretell the onset of 
peaking and possible wildcards that might change the timing of world 
conventional oil production peaking.  In conclusion, we frame the challenge of an 
unknown date for peaking, its potentially extensive economic impacts, and 
available mitigation options as a matter of risk management and prudent 
response.  The reader is asked to contemplate three major questions: 
 
• What are the risks of heavy reliance on optimistic world oil 
production peaking projections? 
 
• Must we wait for the onset of oil shortages before actions are 
taken? 
 
• What can be done to ensure that prudent mitigation is    
initiated on a timely basis?  
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II.   PEAKING OF WORLD OIL PRODUCTION3 
 
A.  Background 
 
Oil was formed by geological processes millions of years ago and is typically 
found in underground reservoirs of dramatically different sizes, at varying depths, 
and with widely varying characteristics.  The largest oil reservoirs are called 
“Super Giants,” many of which were discovered in the Middle East.  Because of 
their size and other characteristics, Super Giant reservoirs are generally the 
easiest to find, the most economic to develop, and the longest lived.  The last 
Super Giant oil reservoirs discovered worldwide were found in 1967 and 1968.  
Since then, smaller reservoirs of varying sizes have been discovered in what are 
called “oil prone” locations worldwide -- oil is not found everywhere. 
 
Geologists understand that oil is a finite resource in the earth’s crust, and at 
some future date, world oil production will reach a maximum -- a peak -- after 
which production will decline.  This logic follows from the well-established fact 
that the output of individual oil reservoirs rises after discovery, reaches a peak 
and declines thereafter.  Oil reservoirs have lifetimes typically measured in 
decades, and peak production often occurs roughly a decade or so after 
discovery.  It is important to recognize that oil production peaking is not “running 
out.”  Peaking is a reservoir’s maximum oil production rate, which typically occurs 
after roughly half of the recoverable oil in a reservoir has been produced.  In 
many ways, what is likely to happen on a world scale is similar to what happens 
to individual reservoirs, because world production is the sum total of production 
from many different reservoirs. 
 
Because oil is usually found thousands of feet below the surface and because oil 
reservoirs normally do not have an obvious surface signature, oil is very difficult 
to find.  Advancing technology has greatly improved the discovery process and 
reduced exploration failures.  Nevertheless, oil exploration is still inexact and 
expensive. 
 
Once oil has been discovered via an exploratory well, full-scale production 
requires many more wells across the reservoir to provide multiple paths that 
facilitate the flow of oil to the surface.  This multitude of wells also helps to define 
the total recoverable oil in a reservoir – its so-called “reserves.” 
 
B.  Oil Reserves 
 
The concept of reserves is generally not well understood.  “Reserves” is an 
estimate of the amount of oil in a reservoir that can be extracted at an assumed 
cost.  Thus, a higher oil price outlook often means that more oil can be produced, 
but geology places an upper limit on price-dependent reserves growth; in well 
                                                
3Portions of this chapter are taken from Hirsch, R.L.  "Six Major Factors in Energy Planning".  
U.S. Department of Energy. National Energy Technology Laboratory. March 2004. 
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managed oil fields, it is often 10-20 percent more than what is available at lower 
prices. 
 
Reserves estimates are revised periodically as a reservoir is developed and new 
information provides a basis for refinement. Reserves estimation is a matter of 
gauging how much extractable oil resides in complex rock formations that exist 
typically one to three miles below the surface of the ground, using inherently 
limited information.  Reserves estimation is a bit like a blindfolded person trying 
to judge what the whole elephant looks like from touching it in just a few places.  
It is not like counting cars in a parking lot, where all the cars are in full view. 
 
Specialists who estimate reserves use an array of methodologies and a great 
deal of judgment.  Thus, different estimators might calculate different reserves 
from the same data. Sometimes politics or self-interest influences reserves 
estimates, e.g., an oil reservoir owner may want a higher estimate in order to 
attract outside investment or to influence other producers. 
 
Reserves and production should not be confused.  Reserves estimates are but 
one factor in estimating future oil production from a given reservoir.  Other factors 
include production history, understanding of local geology, available technology, 
oil prices, etc.  An oil field can have large estimated reserves, but if the field is 
past its maximum production, the remaining reserves will be produced at a 
declining rate.  This concept is important because satisfying increasing oil 
demand not only requires continuing to produce older oil reservoirs with their 
declining production, it also requires finding new ones, capable of producing 
sufficient quantities of oil to both compensate for shrinking production from older 
fields and to provide the increases demanded by the market. 
 
C.  Production Peaking 
 
World oil demand is expected to grow 50 percent by 2025.4   To meet that 
demand, ever-larger volumes of oil will have to be produced. Since oil production 
from individual reservoirs grows to a peak and then declines, new reservoirs 
must be continually discovered and brought into production to compensate for 
the depletion of older reservoirs. If large quantities of new oil are not discovered 
and brought into production somewhere in the world, then world oil production 
will no longer satisfy demand.  That point is called the peaking of world 
conventional oil production. 
 
When world oil production peaks, there will still be large reserves remaining.  
Peaking means that the rate of world oil production cannot increase; it also 
means that production will thereafter decrease with time. 
 
                                                
4U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration, International Energy Outlook – 
2004, April 2004. 
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The peaking of world oil production has been a matter of speculation from the 
beginning of the modern oil era in the mid 1800s.  In the early days, little was 
known about petroleum geology, so predictions of peaking were no more than 
guesses without basis.  Over time, geological understanding improved 
dramatically and guessing gave way to more informed projections, although the 
knowledge base involves numerous uncertainties even today. 
 
Past predictions typically fixed peaking in the succeeding 10-20 year period.  
Most such predictions were wrong, which does not negate that peaking will 
someday occur.  Obviously, we cannot know if recent forecasts are wrong until 
predicted dates of peaking pass without incident. 
 
With a history of failed forecasts, why revisit the issue now?  The reasons are as 
follows: 
 
1.  Extensive drilling for oil and gas has provided a massive worldwide database; 
current geological knowledge is much more extensive than in years past, i.e., we 
have the knowledge to make much better estimates than previously. 
 
2.  Seismic and other exploration technologies have advanced dramatically in 
recent decades, greatly improving our ability to discover new oil reservoirs.  
Nevertheless, the oil reserves discovered per exploratory well began dropping 
worldwide over a decade ago.  We are finding less and less oil in spite of 
vigorous efforts, suggesting that nature may not have much more to provide. 
 
3.  Many credible analysts have recently become much more pessimistic about 
the possibility of finding the huge new reserves needed to meet growing world 
demand. 
 
4.  Even the most optimistic forecasts suggest that world oil peaking will occur in 
less than 25 years. 
 
5.  The peaking of world oil production could create enormous economic 
disruption, as only glimpsed during the 1973 oil embargo and the 1979 Iranian oil 
cut-off. 
 
Accordingly, there are compelling reasons for in-depth, unbiased reconsideration. 
 
D. Types of Oil 
 
Oil is classified as “Conventional” and “Unconventional.”  Conventional oil is 
typically the highest quality, lightest oil, which flows from underground reservoirs 
with comparative ease.  Unconventional oils are heavy, often tar-like.  They are 
not readily recovered since production typically requires a great deal of capital 
investment and supplemental energy in various forms.  For that reason, most 
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current world oil production is conventional oil.5  (Unconventional oil production 
will be discussed in Chapter VI). 
 
E.  Oil Resources6 
 
Consider the world resource of conventional oil.  In the past, higher prices led to 
increased estimates of conventional oil reserves worldwide.  However, this price-
reserves relationship has its limits, because oil is found in discrete packages 
(reservoirs) as opposed to the varying concentrations characteristic of many 
minerals.  Thus, at some price, world reserves of recoverable conventional oil will 
reach a maximum because of geological fundamentals.  Beyond that point, 
insufficient additional conventional oil will be recoverable at any realistic price.  
This is a geological fact that is often misunderstood by people accustomed to 
dealing with hard minerals, whose geology is fundamentally different.  This 
misunderstanding often clouds rational discussion of oil peaking. 
 
Future world recoverable reserves are the sum of the oil remaining in existing 
reservoirs plus the reserves to be added by future oil discoveries. Future oil 
production will be the sum of production from older reservoirs in decline, newer 
reservoirs from which production is increasing, and yet-to-be discovered 
reservoirs. 
 
Because oil prices have been relatively high for the past decade, oil companies 
have conducted extensive exploration over that period, but their results have 
been disappointing.  If recent trends hold, there is little reason to expect that 
exploration success will dramatically improve in the future.  This situation is 
evident in Figure II-1, which shows the difference between annual world oil 
reserves additions minus annual consumption.7  The image is one of a world 
moving from a long period in which reserves additions were much greater than  
consumption, to an era in which annual additions are falling increasingly short of 
annual consumption.  This is but one of a number of trends that suggest the 
world is fast approaching the inevitable peaking of conventional world oil 
production. 
 
F.  Impact of Higher Prices and New Technology 
 
Conventional oil has been the mainstay of modern civilization for more than a 
century, because it is most easily brought to the surface from deep underground 
reservoirs, and it is the most easily refined into finished fuels.  The U.S. was 
endowed with huge reserves of petroleum, which underpinned U.S. economic 
                                                
5U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration, International Energy Outlook – 
2004, April 2004. 
6 Total oil in place is called the “resource.”  However, only a part of the resource can be 
produced, because of geological complexities and economic limitations.  That which is 
realistically recoverable is called “reserves,” which varies within limits depending on oil prices. 
7Aleklett, K. & Campbell, C.J. "The Peak and Decline of World Oil and Gas Production". Uppsala 
University, Sweden. ASPO web site. 2003. 
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Figure II-1.  Net Difference Between Annual World Oil Reserves Additions 
and Annual Consumption 
 
growth in the early and mid twentieth century.  However, U.S. oil resources, like 
those in the world, are finite, and growing U.S. demand resulted in the peaking of 
U.S. oil production in the Lower 48 states in the early 1970s.  With relatively 
minor exceptions, U.S. Lower 48 oil production has been in continuing decline 
ever since.  Because U.S. demand for petroleum products continued to increase, 
the U.S. became an oil importer.  Today, the U.S. depends on foreign sources for 
almost 60 percent of its needs, and future U.S. imports are projected to rise to 70 
percent of demand by 2025.8 
 
Over the past 50 years, exploration for and production of petroleum has been an 
increasingly more technological enterprise, benefiting from more sophisticated 
engineering capabilities, advanced geological understanding, improved 
instrumentation, greatly expanded computing power, more durable materials, etc. 
Today’s technology allows oil reservoirs to be more readily discovered and better 
understood sooner than heretofore.  Accordingly, reservoirs can be produced 
more rapidly, which provides significant economic advantages to the operators 
but also hastens peaking and depletion. 
 
Some economists expect higher oil prices and improved technologies to continue 
to provide ever-increasing oil production for the foreseeable future.  Most 
geologists disagree because they do not believe that there are many huge new 
oil reservoirs left to be found.  Accordingly, geologists and other observers 
believe that supply will eventually fall short of growing world demand – and result 
in the peaking of world conventional oil production. 
                                                
8U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration, International Energy Outlook – 
2004, April 2004. 
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To gain some insight into the effects of higher oil prices and improved technology 
on oil production, let us briefly examine related impacts in the U.S. Lower 48 
states.  This region is a useful surrogate for the world, because it was one of the 
world’s richest, most geologically varied, and most productive up until 1970, 
when production peaked and started into decline. While the U.S. is the best 
available surrogate, it should be remembered that the decline rate in US 
production was in part impacted by the availability of large volumes of relatively 
low cost oil from the Middle East. 
 
Figure II-2 shows EIA data for Lower 48 oil production,9 to which trend lines have 
been added that will aid our scenarios analysis later in the report.  The trend lines 
show a relatively symmetric, triangular pattern.  For reference, four notable 
petroleum market events are noted in the figure:  the 1973 OPEC oil embargo, 
the 1979 Iranian oil crisis, the 1986 oil price collapse, and the 1991 Iraq war. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Production 
(Billions of  
   Barrels) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure II-2.  U.S. Lower 48 Oil Production, 1945-2000 
 
Figure II-3 shows Lower 48 historical oil production with oil prices and technology 
trends added.  In constant dollars, oil prices increased by roughly a factor of 
three in 1973-74 and another factor of two in 1979-80. The modest production 
up-ticks in the mid 1980s and early 1990s are likely responses to the 1973 and 
1979 oil price spikes, both of which spurred a major increase in U.S exploration 
and production investments.  The delays in production response are inherent to 
the implementation of large-scale oil field investments.  The fact that the 
                                                
9U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration, Long Term World Oil Supply, 
April 18, 2000. 
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production up-ticks were moderate was due to the absence of attractive 
exploration and production opportunities, because of geological realities.  
Beyond oil price increases, the 1980s and 1990s were a golden age of oil field 
technology development, including practical 3-D seismic, economic horizontal 
drilling, and dramatically improved geological understanding.  Nevertheless, as 
Figure II-3 shows, Lower 48 production still trended downward, showing no 
pronounced response to either price or technology.  In light of this experience, 
there is good reason to expect that an analogous situation will exist worldwide 
after world oil production peaks:  Higher prices and improved technology are 
unlikely to yield dramatically higher conventional oil production.10 
 
 
 
 
          1950    1960      1970      1980      1990      2000 
 
Figure II-3.  Lower 48 Oil Production and Oil Prices  
 
 
G.  Projections of the Peaking of World oil Production 
 
Projections of future world oil production will be the sum total of 1) output from all 
of the world’s then existing producing oil reservoirs, which will be in various 
stages of development, and 2) all the yet-to-be discovered reservoirs in their 
various states of development.  This is an extremely complex summation 
problem, because of the variability and possible biases in publicly available data. 
In practice, estimators use various approximations to predict future world oil 
                                                
10 The US Lower 48 experience occurred over a long period characterized at different times by 
production controls (Texas Railroad Commission), price and allocation controls (1970s), free 
market prices (since 1981), wild price swings, etc., as well as higher prices and advancing 
technology.  Nevertheless, production peaked and moved into a relatively constant rate of 
decline. 
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production.  The remarkable complexity of the problem can easily lead to 
incorrect conclusions, either positive or negative. 
 
Various individuals and groups have used available information and geological 
estimates to develop projections for when world oil production might peak.  A 
sampling of recent projections is shown in Table II-1. 
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 Table II-1.  Projections of the Peaking of World Oil Production 
 
Projected Date Source of Projection Background & Reference 
 
2006-2007  Bakhitari, A.M.S.  Iranian Oil Executive11 
 
2007-2009 Simmons, M.R.  Investment banker 12 
 
After 2007  Skrebowski, C.  Petroleum journal Editor 13              
 
Before 2009  Deffeyes, K.S.   Oil company geologist (ret.) 14                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
 
Before 2010  Goodstein, D.   Vice Provost, Cal Tech 15  
 
Around 2010  Campbell, C.J.  Oil company geologist (ret.) 16 
 
 
After 2010  World Energy Council World Non-Government Org.17 
 
2010-2020   Laherrere, J.   Oil company geologist (ret.) 18 
 
2016   EIA nominal case  DOE analysis/ information19 
 
 
 
After 2020  CERA    Energy consultants 20 
 
2025 or later  Shell    Major oil company 21 
 
No visible peak Lynch, M.C.   Energy economist22 
                                                
11Bakhtiari, A.M.S.  "World Oil Production Capacity Model Suggests Output Peak by 2006-07."  
OGJ.  April 26, 2004. 
12Simmons, M.R.  ASPO Workshop.  May 26, 2003. 
13Skrebowski, C. "Oil Field Mega Projects - 2004."  Petroleum Review. January 2004. 
14Deffeyes, K.S.  Hubbert’s Peak-The Impending World Oil Shortage.  Princeton University Press. 
2003.  
15Goodstein, D.  Out of Gas – The End of the Age of Oil.  W.W. Norton.  2004 
16Campbell, C.J.  "Industry Urged to Watch for Regular Oil Production Peaks, Depletion Signals."  
OGJ.  July 14, 2003. 
17Drivers of the Energy Scene.  World Energy Council.  2003. 
18Laherrere, J.   Seminar Center of Energy Conversion.  Zurich. May 7, 2003   
19DOE EIA.  "Long Term World Oil Supply."  April 18, 2000. See Appendix I for discussion. 
20Jackson, P. et al.  "Triple Witching Hour for Oil Arrives Early in 2004 – But, As Yet, No Real 
Witches."  CERA Alert.  April 7, 2004. 
21Davis, G.  "Meeting Future Energy Needs."  The Bridge.  National Academies Press.  Summer 
2003. 
22Lynch, M.C.  "Petroleum Resources Pessimism Debunked in Hubbert Model and Hubbert 
Modelers’ Assessment."   Oil and Gas Journal, July 14, 2003. 
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III.  WHY THE TRANSITION WILL BE SO TIME CONSUMING 
 
A.  Introduction 
 
Use of petroleum is pervasive throughout the U.S. economy.  It is directly linked 
to all market sectors because all depend on oil-consuming capital stock.  Oil 
price shocks and supply constraints can often be mitigated by temporary 
decreases in consumption; however, long term price increases resulting from oil 
peaking will cause more serious impacts. Here we examine historical oil usage 
patterns by market sector, provide a summary of current consumption patterns, 
identify the most important markets, examine the relationship between oil and 
capital stock, and provide estimates of the time and costs required to transition to 
more energy efficient technologies that can play a role in mitigating the adverse 
effects of world oil peaking. 
 
B.  Historical U.S. Oil Consumption Patterns 
 
After the two oil price shocks and supply disruptions in 1973-74 and 1979, oil 
consumption in the U.S. decreased 13 percent, declining from nearly 35 quads in 
1973 to 30 quads in 1983.  However, overall consumption continued to grow after 
the 1983 low and has continuously increased over the last 20 years, reaching 
over 39 quads in 2003, as shown in Figure III-1.  Of particular note are changes 
in three U.S. market sectors:  1) Oil consumption in the residential sector 
declined from eight percent of total oil consumption in 1973 to four percent in 
2003, a decrease of 50 percent; 2) Oil consumption in the commercial sector 
declined from five percent to two percent, decreasing 58 percent; and 3) 
Consumption in the electric power sector fell from 10 percent in 1973 to three 
percent in 2003, decreasing 70 percent.  These three market sectors currently 
account for 1.3 quads of oil consumption annually, representing nine percent of 
U.S. oil demand in 2003. 
 
Oil consumption in other market sectors did not decrease.  A 140 percent growth 
in GDP over the 1973-2003 period made it difficult to decrease oil consumption in 
the industrial and transportation sectors.23  In particular, personal transportation 
grew significantly over the past three decades, and total vehicle miles traveled for 
cars and light trucks more than doubled over the period.24  From 1973 to 2003, 
consumption of oil in the industrial sector stayed relatively flat at just over nine 
quads, and the industrial sector’s share of total U.S. consumption remained 
between 24 and 26 percent.  In sharp contrast to all other sectors, U.S. oil 
consumption for transportation purposes has increased steadily every year, rising 
from just over 17 quads in 1973 to 26 quads in 2003.  By 2003, the transportation 
sector accounted for two-thirds of the oil consumed in the U.S. 
 
                                                
23U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, National Income and Product 
Accounts, 2004. 
24U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Highway Administration,  Highway Statistics, 2004.  
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Figure III-1.  U.S. Petroleum Consumption by Sector, 1973-200325 
 
 
C.  Petroleum in the Current U.S. Economy 
 
The 39 quad consumption of oil in the U.S. in 2003 is equivalent to 19.7 million 
barrels of oil per day (MM bpd), including almost 13.1 MM bpd consumed by the 
transportation sector and 4.9 MM bpd by the industrial sector, as shown in Table 
III-1.  This table also shows the petroleum fuel types consumed by each sector.  
Motor gasoline consumption accounted for 45 percent of U.S. daily petroleum 
consumption, nearly 9 MM bpd, almost all of which was used in autos and light 
trucks.  Distillate fuel oil was the second-most consumed oil product at almost 3.8 
MM bpd (19 percent of consumption), and most was used as diesel fuel for 
medium and heavy trucks.  Finally, the third most consumed oil product was 
liquefied petroleum gases, at 2.2 MM bpd equivalent (11 percent of total 
consumption),  most of which was used in the industrial sector as feedstock by 
the chemicals industry.  Only two other consuming areas exceeded the 1 MM 
bpd level:  kerosene and jet fuel in the transportation sector, primarily for 
airplanes, and "other petroleum" by the industrial sector, primarily petroleum 
                                                
25U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration, Monthly Energy Review, 2004. 
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feedstocks used to produce non-fuel products in the petroleum and chemical 
industries. 
 
Table III-1. 
Detailed Consumption of Petroleum in the U.S. 
by Fuel Type and Sector - 200326 
(Thousand of barrels per day) 
 
 Residential Commercial Industrial Transportation Electric 
Power 
Total 
Motor Gasoline - 20 159 8,665 - 8,844 
Distillate Fuel Oil 421 236 603 2,455 51 3,766 
LPG 429 76 1,648 10 - 2,163 
Kerosene/Jet Fuel 27 9 7 1,608 - 1,651 
Residual - 30 87 250 291 658 
Asphalt & Road Oil - - 513 - - 513 
Petroleum Coke - - 398 - 61 459 
Lubricants - - 78 73 - 151 
Aviation Gas - - - 18 - 18 
Other Petroleum - - 1,435 - - 1,435 
Total 877 371 4,928 13,079 403 19,658 
 
 
D.  Capital Stock Characteristics in the Largest Consuming Sectors 
 
Energy efficiency improvements and technological changes are typically 
incorporated into products and services slowly, and their rate of market 
penetration is based on customer preferences and costs.  In the 1974-1983 
period, oil prices ratcheted up to newer, higher levels, which lead to significant 
energy efficiency improvements, energy fuel switching, and other more general 
technological changes.  Some changes came about due to legislative mandates 
(corporate average fuel economy standards, CAFE) or subsidies (solar energy 
and energy efficiency tax credits), but many were the result of economic 
decisions to reduce long-term costs. Under a normal course of replacement 
based on historical trends, oil-consuming capital stock has been replaced in the 
U.S. over a period of 15 to 50 years and has cost consumers and businesses 
trillions of dollars, as discussed below.  
 
Automobiles represent the largest single oil-consuming capital stock in the U.S.  
130 million autos consume 4.9 MM bpd, or 25 percent of total consumption, as 
shown in Table III-2.  Autos remain in the U.S. transportation fleet, or rolling 
stock, for a long time.  While the financial-based current-cost, average age of 
autos is only 3.4 years, the average age of the stock is currently nine years.  
                                                
26U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration, Detailed annual petroleum 
consumption accounts by fuel and sector at www,eia.doe,gov, 2004 
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Recent studies show that one half of the1990-model year cars will remain on the 
road 17 years later in 2007.  At normal replacement rates, consumers will spend 
an estimated $1.3 trillion (constant 2003 dollars) over the next 10-15 years just to 
replace one-half the stock of automobiles.27 
 
Table III-2. 
U.S. Capital Stock Profiles 
 
  Light Heavy Air 
 Autos Trucks Trucks Carriers 
Oil consumption (MM bpd)28 4.9 3.6 3.0 1.1 
 
Share of the U.S. total 25% 18% 16% 6% 
Current cost of net capital stock 
(billion $)29 
 
 
$571 B 
 
$435 B 
 
$686 B             
 
$110 B 
Fleet size30 
 
130 MM 80 MM 7 MM 8,500 
Number of annual purchases 8.5 MM 8.5 MM 500,000 400 
 
Average age of stock (years) 9 7 9 13 
 
Median lifetime (years) 17 16 28 22 
 
A similar situation exists with light trucks (vans, pick-ups, and SUVs), which 
consume 3.6 MM bpd of oil, accounting for 18 percent of total oil consumption.  
Light trucks are depreciated on a faster schedule, and their financial-based 
current-cost average age is 2.9 years.  However, the average physical age of the 
rolling stock is seven years, and the median lifetime of light trucks is 16 years.  At 
current replacement rates, one-half of the 80-million light trucks will be replaced 
in the next 9-14 years at a cost of $1 trillion. 
 
Seven million heavy trucks (including buses, highway trucks, and off-highway 
trucks) represent the third largest consumer of oil at 3.0 MM bpd, 16 percent of 
total consumption.  The current-cost average age of heavy trucks is 5.0 years, 
                                                
27 Because of the lack of national average "replacement value" estimates, current-cost net capital 
stock provides a suitable substitute for the estimates.  Given the capital equipment depreciation 
schedule used, the total replacement value of the capital stock is projected to be 4.5 times higher 
than the current-cost net value 
28U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration,  Annual Energy Outlook - 2004, 
and Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Transportation Energy Data Book #23, 2003. 
29 U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, Fixed Asset Tables, 1992-2002.  
The estimate of net stock includes an adjustment for depreciation, defined as the decline in value 
of the stock of assets due to wear and tear, obsolescence, accidental damage, and aging.  For 
most types of assets, estimates of depreciation are based on a geometric decline in value.  
30 Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Transportation Energy Data Book #23, 2003; and U.S. 
Department of Transportation, Bureau of Transportation Statistics, Active Air Carrier Fleet; and 
Management Information Services, Inc., 2004. 
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but the median lifetime of this equipment is 28 years.  The disparity in the 
average age and the median lifetime estimates indicate that a significant number 
of vehicles are 40-60 years old.  At normal replacement levels, one-half of the 
heavy truck stock will be replaced by businesses in the next 15-20 years at a 
cost of $1.5 trillion. 
 
The fourth-largest consumer of oil is the airlines, which consume the equivalent 
of 1.1 MM bpd, representing six percent of U.S. consumption.  The 8,500 aircraft 
have a current-cost average age of 9.1 years, and  a median lifetime of  22 
years. Airline deregulation and the events of September 11, 2001, have had 
significant effects on the industry, its ownership, and recent business decisions. 
At recent rates, airlines will replace one-half of their stock over the next 15-20 
years at a cost of $250 billion. 
 
These four capital stock categories cover most transportation modes and 
represent 65 percent of the consumption of oil in the U.S.31 The three largest 
categories of autos, light trucks, and heavy trucks all utilize the internal 
combustion engine, whether gasoline- or diesel-burning.  Clearly, advancements 
in energy efficiency and replacement in this capital stock (for instance, electric-
hybrid engines) would help mitigate the economic impacts of rising oil prices 
caused by world oil peaking.  However, as described, the normal replacement 
rates of this equipment will require 10-20 years and cost trillions of dollars.  We 
cannot conceive of any affordable government-sponsored "crash program" to 
accelerate normal replacement schedules so as to incorporate higher energy 
efficiency technologies into the privately-owned transportation sector; significant 
improvements in energy efficiency will thus be inherently time-consuming (of the 
order of a decade or more).  
 
When oil prices increase associated with oil peaking, consumers and businesses 
will attempt to reduce their exposure by substitution or by decreases in 
consumption.   In the short run, there may be interest in the substitution of natural 
gas for oil in some applications, but the current outlook for natural gas availability 
and price is cloudy for a decade or more. An increase in demand for electricity in 
rail transportation would increase the need for more electric power plants. In the 
short run, much of the burden of adjustment will likely be borne by decreases in 
consumption from discretionary decisions, since 67 percent of personal 
automobile travel and nearly 50 percent of airplane travel are discretionary.32 
 
                                                
31The largest remaining oil-consuming capital stock resides in the industrial sector.  Oil 
consumption in the industrial sector is diverse, making it difficult to target specific capital stock 
and identify potential efficiency efforts or potential technology advancements.  The largest oil-
consuming industries include the chemical, lumber and wood, paper products, and petroleum 
industry itself.  Functional usage of oil in the industry includes heat, process heat, power, 
feedstock, and lubrication.  Finally, the equipment spans hundreds of disparate types of in situ 
engines, turbines, and agricultural, construction, and mining machinery.  
32U.S. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Transportation Statistics, American Travel Survey 
Profile and Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Transportation Energy Data Book - 2003. 
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E. Consumption Outside the U.S.  
 
Oil consumption patterns differ in other countries.   While two-thirds of U.S. oil 
use is in the transportation sector, worldwide that share is estimated about 55 
percent.  However, that difference is narrowing as world economic development 
is expanding transportation demands at an even faster pace.  A portion of non-
transportation oil consumption is switchable.  As stated by EIA, “Oil’s importance 
in other end-use sectors is likely to decline where other fuels are competitive, 
such as natural gas, coal, and nuclear, in the electric sector, but currently there is 
no alternative energy sources that compete economically with oil in the 
transportation sector.”33  Because sector-by-sector oil consumption data for many 
counties is unavailable, a detailed analysis of world consumption  was beyond 
the scope of this report.  Nevertheless, it is clear that transportation is the primary 
market for oil worldwide.        
 
F.  Transition Conclusions 
 
Any transition of liquid fueled, end-use equipment following oil peaking will be  
time consuming. The depreciated value of existing U.S. transportation capital 
stock is nearly $2 trillion and would normally require 25 – 30 years to replace.  At 
that rate, significantly more energy efficient equipment will only be slowly phased 
into the marketplace as new capital stock gradually replaces existing stock. Oil 
peaking will likely accelerate replacement rates, but the transition will still require 
decades and cost trillions of dollars. 
                                                
33 U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration.  International Energy Annual, 
2004.  April 2004. 
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IV. LESSONS AND IMPLICATIONS FROM PREVIOUS OIL   
SUPPLY DISRUPTIONS 
 
A.  Previous Oil Supply Shortfall and Disruptions 
 
There have been over a dozen global oil supply disruptions34 over the past half-
century, as summarized in Figure IV-1. 
 
 
 
Figure IV-1.  Global Oil Supply Disruptions:  1954-2003 
 
Briefly, 
 
• Disruptions ranged in duration from one to 44 months.  Supply shortfalls 
were 0.3 - 4.6 MM bpd, and eight resulted in average gross supply 
shortfalls of at least 2 MM bpd. 
 
• Percentage supply shortfalls varied from roughly one percent to nearly 14 
percent of world production. 
                                                
34U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration, “Latest Oil Supply Disruption 
Information,“ eia.doe.gov, 2004; U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration,. 
“World Oil Market and Oil Price Chronologies: 1970-2003,” March 2004; U.S. Department of 
Energy, Energy Information Administration, “Global Oil Supply Disruptions Since 1951”, 2001; 
U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration, Annual Energy Review, 
2002;U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration,   International Petroleum 
Monthly, April 2004. 
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• The most traumatic disruption, 1973-74, was not the most severe, but it 
nevertheless lead to greatly increased oil prices and significant worldwide 
economic damage. 
 
• The second most traumatic disruption, 1979, was also neither the longest 
nor the most severe. 
 
For purposes of this study, the 1973-74 and 1979 disruptions are taken as the 
most relevant, because they are believed to offer the best insights into what 
might occur when world oil production peaks.  
 
 
B.  Difficulties in Deriving Implications From Past Experience 
 
Over the past 30 years, most economic studies of the impact of oil supply 
disruptions assumed that the interruptions were temporary and that each 
situation would shortly return to “normal.”  Thus, the major focus of most studies 
was determination of the appropriate fiscal and monetary policies required to 
minimize negative economic impacts and the development of policies to help the 
economy and labor market adjust until the disruption ended.35  Few economists 
considered  a situation where the oil supply shortfall may be long-lived (a decade 
or more). 
 
Since 1970, most large oil price increases were eventually followed by oil price 
declines, and, since these cycles were expected to be repeated, it was generally 
felt that “the problem will take care of itself as long at the government does 
nothing and does not interfere.”36  The frequent and incorrect predictions of oil 
shortfalls have been often used to discredit future predictions of a longer-term 
problem and to discredit the need for appropriate long-term U.S. energy policies. 
 
C.  How Oil Supply Shortfalls Affect the Global Economy 
 
Oil prices play a key role in the global economy, since the major impact of an oil 
supply disruption is higher oil prices.37  Oil price increases transfer income from 
                                                
35This is verified by the extensive literature review conducted by Donald W. Jones and Paul N. 
Leiby, “The Macroeconomic Impacts of Oil Price Shocks:  A Review of the Literature and Issues,” 
Oak Ridge National Laboratory, January 1996, and by Donald W. Jones, Paul N. Leiby, and Inja 
K Paik, “Oil Price Shocks and the Macroeconomy:  What Has Been Learned Since 1996, The 
Energy Journal, 2003. 
36See, for example, Leonardo Maugeri, “Oil:  Never Cry Wolf – Why the Petroleum Age is Far 
From Over, “ Science, Vol. 304, May 21, 2004, pp. 1114-1115;  Michael C. Lynch, “Closed Coffin:  
Ending the Debate on ‘The End of Cheap Oil,’ A Commentary,” DRI/WEFA, September 2001; 
Michael C. Lynch “Farce This Time:  Renewed Pessimism About Oil Supply, 2000; Bjorn 
Lomborg, “Running on Empty?” Guardian, August 16, 2001; Mark Mills, “Stop Worrying About Oil 
Prices,” 2001, fossilfuels.org; Jerry Taylor, “Markets Work Magic,” Cato Institute, January 2002; 
Rethinking Emergency Energy Policy, U.S. Congressional Budget Office, December 1994. 
37This is the consensus of virtually every rigorous analysis of the problem; see, for example, the 
International Monetary Fund study conducted by Benjamin Hunt, Peter Isard, and Douglas 
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oil importing to oil exporting countries, and the net impact on world economic 
growth is negative.  For oil importing countries, increased oil prices reduce 
national income because spending on oil rises, and there is less available to 
spend on other goods and services.38  Not surprisingly, the larger the oil price 
increase and the longer higher prices are sustained, the more severe is the 
macroeconomic impact. 
 
Higher oil prices result in increased costs for the production of goods and 
services, as well as inflation, unemployment, reduced demand for products other 
than oil, and lower capital investment.  Tax revenues decline and budget deficits 
increase, driving up interest rates.  These effects will be greater the more abrupt 
and severe the oil price increase and will be exacerbated by the impact on 
consumer and business confidence. 
 
Government policies cannot eliminate the adverse impacts of sudden, severe oil 
disruptions, but they can minimize them.  On the other hand, contradictory 
monetary and fiscal policies to control inflation can exacerbate recessionary 
income and unemployment effects. (See Appendix II for further discussion of 
past government actions). 
 
D.  The U.S. Experience 
 
As illustrated in Figure IV-2, oil price increases have preceded most U.S. 
recessions since 1969, and virtually every serious oil price shock was followed by 
a recession.  Thus, while oil price spikes may not be necessary to trigger a 
recession in the U.S., they have proven to be sufficient over the past 30 years. 
 
E.  The Experience of Other Countries 
 
1.  The Developed (OECD) Economies 
 
Estimates of the damage caused by past oil price disruptions vary substantially, 
but without a doubt, the effects were significant.  Economic growth decreased in 
most oil importing countries following the disruptions of 1973-74 and 1979-80, 
and the impact of the first oil shock was accentuated by inappropriate policy 
responses.39  Despite a decline in the ratio of oil consumption to GDP over the 
past three decades, oil remains vital, and there is considerable empirical 
evidence regarding the effects of oil price shocks: 
  
                                                                                                                                            
Saxton, “The Macroeconomic Effects of Oil Price Shocks,” National Institute Economic Review 
No. 179, January 2002. 
38“The Impact of Higher Oil Prices on the World Economy,” OECD Standing Group on Long-Term 
Cooperation, 2003. 
39See Lee, Ni, and Ratti, op. cit., and J.D. Hamilton and A.M. Herrera “Oil Shocks and Aggregate 
Macroeconomic Behavior:  The Role of Monetary Policy,” Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 
2003. 
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            Figure IV-2.  Oil Prices and U.S. Recessions:  1969-200340 
 
 
 
• The loss suffered by the OECD countries in the 1974/-75 recession 
amounted to $350 billion (current dollars) / $1.1 trillion 2003 dollars, 
although part of this loss was related to factors other than oil 
price.41 
• The loss resulting from the 1979 oil disruption was about three 
percent of GDP ($350 billion in current dollars) in 1980 rising to 
4.25 percent ($570 billion) in 1981, and accounted for much of the 
decline in economic growth and the increase in inflation and 
unemployment in the OECD in 1981-82.42 
• The effect of the 1990-91 oil price upsurge was more modest, 
because price increases were smaller; they did not persist; and oil 
intensity in OECD countries had declined. 
                                                
40 U.S. Joint Economic Committee and Management Information Services, Inc., 2004. 
41 This totals about $1.1 trillion in 2003 dollars and was equivalent to a once-and-for-all reduction 
in real GDP of about seven percent; however, part of that loss was likely attributable to structural 
and cyclical economic factors unrelated to the oil-price shock.  See Faith Bird, “Analysis of the 
Impact of High Oil Price on the Global Economy,” International Energy Agency, 2003. 
42 These losses totaled about $700 billion and $1.1 trillion, respectively in 2003 dollars.  Losses of 
this magnitude are significant and represent the difference between vibrant, growing economies 
and economies in deep recession.  There is considerable debate as to precisely how much of 
these losses was attributable to the oil price shocks, to fiscal and monetary policies, and to other 
factors. 
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• Although oil intensity and the share of oil in total imports have 
declined in recent years, OECD economies remain vulnerable to 
higher oil prices, because of the “life blood” nature of liquid fuel use. 
 
2. Developing Countries 
 
Developing countries suffer more than the developed countries from oil price 
increases because they generally use energy less efficiently and because 
energy-intensive manufacturing accounts for a larger share of their GDP.  On 
average, developing countries use more than twice as much oil to produce a unit 
of output as developed countries, and oil intensity is increasing in developing 
countries as commercial fuels replace traditional fuels and 
industrialization/urbanization continues.43 
 
The vulnerability of developing countries is exacerbated by their limited ability to 
switch to alternative fuels.  In addition, an increase in oil import costs also can 
destabilize trade balances and increase inflation more in developing countries, 
where financial institutions and monetary authorities are often relatively 
unsophisticated.  This problem is most pronounced for the poorest developing 
countries. 
 
F.  Implications 
 
 1. The World Economy 
 
A shortfall of oil supplies caused by world conventional oil production peaking will 
sharply increase oil prices and oil price volatility.  As oil peaking is approached, 
relatively minor events will likely have  more pronounced impacts on oil prices 
and futures markets. 
 
Oil prices remain a key determinant of global economic performance, and world 
economic growth over the past 50 years has been negatively impacted in the 
wake of increased oil prices.  The greater the supply shortfall, the higher the 
price increases; the longer the shortfall, the greater will be the adverse economic 
affects.  
 
The long-run impact of sustained, significantly increased oil prices associated 
with oil peaking will be severe.  Virtually certain are increases in inflation and 
unemployment, declines in the output of goods and services, and a degradation 
of living standards.  Without timely mitigation, the long-run impact on the 
developed economies will almost certainly be extremely damaging, while many 
developing nations will likely be even worse off.44 
                                                
43See Bird, op. cit., and OECD Standing Group on Long-Term Cooperation, op. cit. 
44A $10/bbl. increase in oil prices, if sustained for a year, will reduce global GDP by 0.6 percent, 
ignoring the secondary effects on confidence, stock markets, and policy responses; see Bird, op. 
cit.  A sustained increase of $10/bbl. would reduce economic growth by 0.5 percent in the 
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The impact of oil price changes will likely be asymmetric.  The negative economic 
effects of oil price increases are usually not offset by the economic stimulus 
resulting from a fall in oil prices.  The increase in economic growth in oil exporting 
countries provided by higher oil prices has been less than the loss of economic 
growth in importing countries, and these effects will likely continue in the future.45 
 
 2. The United States 
 
For the U.S., each 50 percent sustained increase in the price of oil will lower real 
U.S. GDP by about 0.5 percent, and a doubling of oil prices would reduce GDP 
by a full percentage point.  Depending on the U.S. economic growth rate at the 
time, this could be a sufficient negative impact to drive the country 
into recession.  Thus, assuming an oil price in the $25 per barrel range -- the 
2002-2003 average, an increase of the price of oil to $50 per barrel would cost 
the economy a reduction in GDP of around $125 billion.   
 
If the shortfall persisted or worsened (as is likely in the case of peaking), the 
economic impacts would be much greater. Oil supply disruptions over the past 
three decades have cost the U.S. economy about $4 trillion, so supply shortfalls 
associated with the approach of peaking could cost the U.S. as much as all of the 
oil supply disruptions since the early 1970s combined. 
 
The effects of oil shortages on the U.S. are also likely to be asymmetric.  Oil 
supply disruptions and oil price increases reduce economic activity, but oil price 
declines have a less beneficial impact.46  Oil shortfalls and price increases will 
cause larger responses in job destruction than job creation, and many more jobs 
may be lost in response to oil price increases than will be regained if oil prices 
were to decrease.  These effects will be more pronounced when oil price volatility 
increases as peaking is approached.  The repeated economic and job losses 
experienced during price spikes will not be replaced as prices decrease. As 
these cycles continue, the net economic and job losses will increase.  
 
Sectoral shifts will likely be pronounced.  Even moderate oil disruptions could 
cause  shifts among sectors and industries of ten percent or more of the labor 
force.47  Continuing oil shortages will likely have disruptive inter-sectoral, inter-
                                                                                                                                            
industrialized countries and by 0.75 percent or more in the developing countries; see Ibid., OECD 
Standing Group on Long-Term Cooperation, op. cit., and International Monetary Fund, World 
Economic Outlook, September 2003.   Larger oil price increases will have even more severe 
economic effects. 
45K.A. Mork, “Business Cycles and the Oil Market,” Energy Journal, special issue, 1994, pp. 15-
38. 
46See Mark Hooker, “Are Oil Shocks Inflationary?  Asymmetric and Nonlinear Specification 
Versus Changes In Regime,” Federal Reserve Board, December 1999. 
47Hillard Huntington, “Energy Disruptions, Interfirm Price Effects, and the Aggregate Economy,” 
Energy Modeling Forum, Stanford University, September 2002; S.J. Davis, and J. Haltiwanger, 
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industry, and inter-regional effects, and the sectors that are (both directly and 
indirectly) oil-dependant could be severely impacted.48 
 
Monetary policy is more effective in controlling the inflationary effects of a supply 
disruption than in averting related recessionary effects.49  Thus, while appropriate 
monetary policy may be successful in lessening the inflationary impacts of oil 
price increases, it may do so at the cost of recession and increased 
unemployment.  Monetary policies tend to be used to increase interest rates to 
control inflation, and it is the high interest rates that cause most of the economic 
damage.  As peaking is approached, devising appropriate offsetting fiscal, 
monetary, and energy policies will become more difficult.  Economically, the 
decade following peaking may resemble the 1970s, only worse, with dramatic 
increases in inflation, long-term recession, high unemployment, and declining 
living standards.50 
 
                                                                                                                                            
“Sectoral Job Creation and Destruction Response to Oil Price Changes,” Journal of Monetary 
Economics, Vol. 48, 2001, pp. 465-512. 
48“Demand destruction” has often been identified as a solution, since oil price increases resulting 
from a disruption will reduce demand and this will moderate further price increases.  However, 
demand is reduced because the economy is devastated and large numbers of jobs are lost.  
Demand destruction – a polite word for economic and job losses – is the problem, not the 
solution.  See the discussion in Roger Bezdek and Robert Wendling, “The Case Against Gas 
Dependence,” Public Utilities Fortnightly, Vol. 142, No. 4, April 2004, pp. 43-47. 
49Joint Economic Committee of the U.S. Congress, “10 Facts About Oil Prices,” March 2003; 
Mark Hooker, “Oil and the Macroeconomy Revisited,” Federal Reserve Board, August 1999. 
50Nevertheless, during disruptions, public actions may be required to address societal risks.  This 
creates a dilemma:  In the event of a severe shortfall of long duration, government intervention of 
some sort may be required, and allocation plans to moderate the effects of this shortfall will likely 
be advocated.  However, given the experience of the 1970s, many of the policies enacted in a 
crisis atmosphere will be, at best, sub-optimal.  For example, in 1980, the Federal government 
developed a Congressionally-mandated stand-by U.S. gasoline rationing plan which could, in 
some form, be implemented; see Standby Gasoline Rationing Plan, U.S. Department of Energy, 
Washington, D.C., June 1980. 
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V.  LEARNING FROM THE NATURAL GAS EXPERIENCE  
 
A.  Introduction 
 
A dramatic example of the risks of over-reliance on geological resource 
projections is the experience with North American natural gas.  Natural gas 
supplies roughly 20 percent of U.S. energy demand.  It has been plentiful  at real 
prices of roughly $2/Mcf for almost two decades.  Over the past 10 years, natural 
gas has become the fuel of choice for new electric power generation plants and, 
at present, virtually all new electric power generation plants use natural gas. 
 
Part of the attractiveness of natural gas was resource estimates for the U.S. and 
Canada that promised growing supply at reasonable prices for the foreseeable 
future. That optimism turns out to have been misplaced, and the U.S. is now 
experiencing supply constraints and high natural gas prices. Supply difficulties 
are almost certain for at least the remainder of the decade.  The North American 
natural gas situation provides some useful lessons relevant to the peaking of 
conventional world oil production.  
 
B.  The Optimism 
 
As recently as 2001, a number of credible groups were optimistic about the ready 
availability of natural gas in North America.  For example: 
 
• In 1999 the National Petroleum Council stated “U.S. production is projected to 
increase from 19 trillion cubic feet (Tcf) in 1998 to 25 Tcf in 2010 and could 
approach 27 Tcf in 2015…. Imports from Canada are projected to increase 
from 3 Tcf in 1998 to almost 4 Tcf in 2010.” 51 
 
• In 2001 Cambridge Energy Research Associates (CERA) stated “The 
rebound in North American gas supply has begun and is expected to be 
maintained at least through 2005. In total, we expect a combination of US 
lower-48 activity, growth in Canadian supply, and growth in LNG imports to 
add 8.95 Bcf per day of production by 2005.” 52 
 
• The U.S. Energy Department’s Energy Information Administration (EIA) in 
1999 projected that U.S. natural gas production would grow continuously from 
a level of 19.4 Tcf in 1998 to 27.1 Tcf in 2020.53  
 
                                                
51National Petroleum Council.  Meeting the Challenges of the Nation's Growing Natural Gas 
Demand.  December 1999. 
52Esser, R. et al. Natural Gas Productive Capacity Outlook in North America - How Fast Can It 
Grow?  Cambridge Energy Research Associates, Inc.  2001. 
53U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration, Annual Energy Outlook 2000. 
December 1999. 
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C.  Today’s Perspectives 
 
The current natural gas supply outlook has changed dramatically.  Among those 
that believe the situation has changed for the worse are the following: 
 
• CERA now finds that “The North American natural gas market is set for the 
longest period of sustained high prices in its history, even adjusting for 
inflation. Disappointing drilling results … have caused CERA to revise the 
outlook for North American supply downward … The downward revisions 
represent additional disappointing supply news, painting a more constrained 
picture for continental supply. Gas production in the United States (excluding 
Alaska) now appears to be in permanent decline, and modest gains in 
Canadian supply will not overcome the US downturn.”54 
 
• Raymond James & Associates finds that “Natural gas production continues to 
drop despite a 20 percent increase in U.S. drilling activity since April 2003.”55  
“U.S. natural gas production is heading firmly downwards…”56 
 
• “Lehman now expects full-year U.S. production to decline by 4% following a 
6% decline in 2003. …. Domestic production is forecast to fall to 41.0 billion 
cubic feet a day by 2008 from 46.8 in 2003 and 52.1 in 1998. After a sharp 
12% fall in 2003, Canadian imports are seen dropping...”57 
 
• The NPC now contends that “Current higher gas prices are the result of a 
fundamental shift in the supply and demand balance.  North America is 
moving to a period in its history in which it will no longer be self-reliant in 
meeting its growing natural gas needs; production from traditional U.S. and 
Canadian basins has plateaued.”58 
 
Canada has been a reliable U.S. source of natural gas imports for decades.  
However, the Canadian situation has recently changed for the worse.  For 
example:  “Natural gas production in Alberta, the largest exporter to the huge 
U.S. market, slipped 2 percent last year despite record drilling and may have 
peaked in 2001, the Canadian province's energy regulator said on Thursday … 
Production peaked at 5.1 trillion cubic feet in 2001. … (EUB) forecast flat 
production in 2004 and an annual decline of 2.5 percent through at least 2013.”59 
 
 
 
                                                
54CERA Advisory Services.  The Worst is Yet to Come: Diverging Fundamentals Challenge the 
North American Gas Market.  Cambridge Energy Research Associates, Inc. Spring 2004. 
55Industry Trends (quoting Raymond James & Associates).  OGJ.  June 7, 2004. 
56Adkins, J.M. et al.  "Energy Industry Brief". Raymond James & Associates.  May 17, 2004. 
57"Lehman Says US 1Q Gas Production Fell By 5.3%".  Dow Jones.  May 12, 2004. 
58National Petroleum Council. Balancing Natural Gas Policy – Fueling the Demands of a Growing 
Economy: Volume I – Summary of Findings and Recommendations. September 25, 2003. 
59Reuters. "Alberta Gas Output Falling Despite Record Drilling".  June 6, 2004.  
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D.  U.S. Natural Gas Price History 
 
EIA data show that U.S. natural gas prices were relatively stable in constant 
dollars from 1987 through1998.60  However, beginning in 2000, prices began to 
escalate -- they were roughly 50 percent higher in 2000 compared to 1998.61  
Skipping over the recession years of 2001 and 2002, prices in late 2003 and 
early 2004 further increased roughly 25 percent over 2000.62  
 
While it is often inappropriate to extrapolate gas or oil prices into the future based 
on short term experience, a number of organizations are now projecting 
increased U.S. natural gas prices for a number of years.  For example, CERA 
now expects natural gas prices to rise steadily through 2007.63 
 
E.  LNG –Delayed Salvation 
 
With North American natural gas production suddenly changed, hopes of 
meeting future demand have turned to imports of liquefied natural gas (LNG).64  
The U.S. has four operating LNG terminals, and a number of proposals for new 
terminals have been advanced.  Indeed, the Secretary of Energy and the 
Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board recently called for a massive buildup in 
LNG imports to meet growing U.S. natural gas demand. 
 
But the construction of new terminals demands state and local approvals.  
Because of NIMBYism and fear of terrorism at LNG facilities, a number of the 
proposed terminals have been rejected.  There are also objections from Mexico, 
which has been proposed as a host for LNG terminals to support west coast 
natural gas demands.65  In the Boston area there is an ongoing debate as to 
whether the nation’s largest LNG terminal in Everett, Massachusetts, ought to be 
shut down, because of terrorist concerns.66  Decommissioning of that terminal 
would exacerbate an already tight national natural gas supply situation. Public 
fears about LNG safety were heightened by an explosion at an LNG liquefaction 
plant in Algeria that killed 27 people in January 2004.  Alternatively, some are 
considering locating LNG terminals offshore with gas pipelined underwater to 
land; related costs will be higher, but safety would be enhanced. 
 
 
 
                                                
60Natural Gas Markets and EIA's Information Program   March 2000. 
61U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration, Natural Gas Annual 2002. 
62U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration,  "Natural Gas Navigator." Last 
Updated 5/6/04. 
63CERA Advisory Services.  "The Worst is Yet to Come: Diverging Fundamentals Challenge the 
North American Gas Market".  Cambridge Energy Research Associates, Inc. Spring 2004. 
64 The Alaska natural gas pipeline is at least 10 years from operation, maybe longer. 
65 Flalka, J.J. & Gold, R.  "Fears of Terrorism Crush Plans For Liquefied-Gas Terminals."  The 
Wall Street Journal.  May 14, 2004. 
66 Bender, B.  "DistriGas Contests Hazard Study Findings."  Boston Globe.  June 2, 2004. 
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F.  The U.S. Current Natural Gas Situation 
 
U.S. natural gas demand is increasing; North American natural gas production is 
declining or poised for decline as indicated in references 53, 54, and 55. The 
planned U.S. expansion of LNG imports is experiencing delays. U.S. natural gas 
supply shows every sign of deteriorating significantly before mitigation provides 
an adequate supply of low cost natural gas.  Because of the time required to 
make major changes in the U.S. natural gas infrastructure and marketplace, 
forecasts of a decade of high prices and shortages are credible. 
 
G.  Lessons Learned 
 
A full discussion of the complex dimensions of the current U.S. natural gas 
situation is beyond the scope of this study; such an effort would require careful 
consideration of geology, reserves estimation, natural gas exploration and 
production, government land restrictions, storage, weather, futures markets, etc. 
Nevertheless, we believe that the foregoing provides a basis for the following 
observations: 
 
• Like oil reserves estimation, natural gas reserves estimation is subject to 
enormous uncertainty. North American natural gas reserves estimates 
now appear to have been excessively optimistic and North American 
natural gas production is now almost certainly in decline. 
 
• High prices do not a priori lead to greater production.  Geology is 
ultimately the limiting factor, and geological realities are clearest after the 
fact. 
 
• Even when urgent, nation-scale energy problems arise, business-as-usual 
mitigation activities can be dramatically delayed or stopped by state and 
local opposition and other factors.  
 
If experts were so wrong on their assessment of North American natural gas, are 
we really comfortable risking that the optimists are correct on world conventional 
oil production, which involves similar geological and technological issues?  
 
If higher prices did not bring forth vast new supplies of North American natural 
gas, are we really comfortable that higher oil prices will bring forth huge new oil 
reserves and production, when similar geology and technologies are involved? 
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VI.  MITIGATION OPTIONS AND ISSUES  
 
A.  Conservation 
 
Practical mitigation of the problems associated with world oil peaking must 
include fuel efficiency technologies that could impact on a large scale. 
Technologies that may offer significant fuel efficiency improvements fall into two 
categories: retrofits, which could improve the efficiency of existing equipment, 
and displacement technologies, which could replace existing, less efficient oil-
consuming equipment.  A comprehensive discussion of this subject is beyond the 
scope of this study, so we focus on what we believe to be the highest impact, 
existing technologies.  Clearly, other technologies might contribute on a lesser 
scale. 
 
From our prior discussion of current liquid fuel usage (Chapter III), it is clear that 
automobiles and light trucks (light duty vehicles or LDVs) represent the largest 
targets for consumption reduction.  This should not be surprising: Auto and LDV 
fuel use is large, and fuel efficiency has not been a consumer priority for 
decades, largely due to the historically low cost of gasoline.  An established but 
relatively little-used engine technology for LDVs in the U.S. is the diesel engine, 
which is up to 30 percent more efficient than comparable gasoline engines.  
Future U.S. use of diesels in LDVs has been problematic due to increasingly 
more stringent U.S. air emission requirements. European regulations are not as 
restrictive, so Europe has a high population of diesel LDVs – between 55 and 70 
percent in some countries. 67 
 
A new technology in early commercial deployment is the hybrid system, based 
on either gasoline or diesel engines and batteries. In all-around driving tests, 
gasoline hybrids have been found to be 40 percent more efficient in small cars 
and 80 percent more efficient in family sedans.68 
 
For retrofit application, neither diesel nor hybrid engines appear to have 
significant potential, so their use will likely be limited to new vehicles.  Under 
business-as-usual market conditions, hybrids might reach roughly 10 percent on-
the-road U.S. market share by 2015.69  That penetration rate is based on the fact 
that the technology has met many of the performance demands of a significant 
number of today’s consumers and that gasoline hybrids use readily available 
fuel.   
 
Government-mandated vehicle fuel efficiency requirements are virtually certain to 
be an element in the mitigation of world oil peaking.  One result would almost 
certainly be the more rapid deployment of diesel and / or hybrid engines. Market 
                                                
67Harvan, R.  "Diesel Use Surging".  World Refining.  June 2004. 
68 Consumer Reports.  August 2004.  Page 49. 
69National Research Council. The Hydrogen Economy:  Opportunities, Costs, Barriers, and R & D 
Needs.  National Academy Press.  2004. 
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penetration of these technologies cannot happen rapidly, because of the time 
and effort required for manufacturers to retool their factories for large-scale 
production and because of the slow turnover of existing stock.  In addition, a shift 
from gasoline to diesel fuel would require a major refitting of refineries, which 
would take time. 
 
Nation-scale retrofit of existing LDVs to provide improved fuel economy has not 
received much attention.  One retrofit technology that might prove attractive for 
the existing LDV fleet is “displacement on demand” in which a number of 
cylinders in an engine are disabled when energy demand is low. The technology 
is now available on new cars, and fuel economy savings of roughly 20 percent 
have been claimed.70  The feasibility and cost of such retrofits are not known, so 
we consider this option to be speculative. 
 
It is difficult to project what the fuel economy benefits of hybrid or diesel LDVs 
might be on a national scale, because consumer preferences will likely change 
once the public understands the potential impacts of the peaking of world oil 
production.  For example, the current emphasis on large vehicles and SUVs 
might well give way to preferences for smaller, much more fuel-efficient vehicles. 
 
The fuel efficiency benefits that hybrids might provide for heavy-duty trucks and 
buses are likely smaller than for LDVs for a number of reasons, including the fact 
that there has long been a commercial demand for higher efficiency technologies 
in order to minimize fuel costs for these fleets.  
 
Hybrids can also impact the medium duty truck fleet, which is now heavily 
populated with diesel engines.  For example, road testing of diesel hybrids in 
FedEx trucks recently began, with fuel economy benefits of 33 percent claimed.71  
On the other hand, there appears to be limits to the fuel economy benefits of 
hybrid engines in large vehicles; for example, the fuel savings in hybrid buses 
might only be in the 10 percent range.72  
 
On the distant horizon, innovations in aircraft design may result in large fuel 
economy improvements.  For example, a 25 to 50 percent fuel efficiency 
improvement may be possible with a new, blended wing aircraft.73  Such benefits 
would require the purchase of entirely new equipment, requiring a decade or 
more for significant market penetration.  Innovations for major liquid fuel savings 
for trains and ships may exist but are not widely publicized.    
 
B.  Improved Oil Recovery  
 
Management of an oil reservoir over its multi-decade life is influenced by a range 
                                                
70Kerwin, K.  "Chrysler Puts Some Muscle on the Street".  Business Week.  June 7, 2004. 
71Press release.  Eaton Corp.,  March 30, 2004. 
72Press release.  National Renewable Energy Technology Laboratory, February 8, 2002. 
73Homes, S.  "A Silver Lining for Boeing".  Business Week. May 24, 2004. 
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of factors, including 1) actual and expected future oil prices; 2) production history, 
geology, and status of the reservoir; 3) cost and character of production-
enhancing technologies; 4) timing of enhancements; 5) the financial condition of 
the operator; 6) political and environmental circumstances, 7) an operator’s other 
investment opportunities, etc.   
 
Improved Oil Recovery (IOR) is used to varying degrees on all oil reservoirs.  
IOR encompasses a variety of methods to increase oil production and to expand 
the volume of recoverable oil from reservoirs.   Options include in-fill drilling, 
hydraulic fracturing, horizontal drilling, advanced reservoir characterization, 
enhanced oil recovery (EOR), and a myriad of other methods that can increase 
the flow and recovery of liquid hydrocarbons. IOR can also include many 
seemingly mundane efficiencies introduced in daily operations.74 
 
IOR technologies are adapted on a case-by-case basis.  It is not possible to 
estimate what IOR techniques or processes might be applied to a specific 
reservoir without having detailed knowledge of that reservoir.  Such knowledge is 
rarely in the public domain for the large conventional oil reservoirs in the world; if 
it were, then a more accurate estimate of the timing of world oil peaking would be 
possible. 
 
A particularly notable opportunity to increase production from existing oil 
reservoirs is the use of enhanced oil recovery technology (EOR), also known as 
tertiary recovery.  EOR is usually initiated after primary and secondary recovery 
have provided most of what they can provide.  Primary production is the process 
by which oil naturally flows to the surface because oil is under pressure 
underground.  Secondary recovery involves the injection of water into a reservoir 
to force additional oil to the surface. 
 
EOR has been practiced since the 1950s in various conventional oil reservoirs, 
particularly in the United States.  The process that likely has the largest 
worldwide potential is miscible flooding wherein carbon dioxide (CO2), nitrogen or 
light hydrocarbons are injected into oil reservoirs where they act as solvents to 
move residual oil.  Of the three options, CO2 flooding has proven to be the most 
frequently useful.  Indeed, naturally occurring, geologically sourced CO2 has 
been produced in Colorado and shipped via pipeline to west Texas and New 
Mexico for decades for EOR. CO2 flooding can increase oil recovery by 7-15 
percent of original oil in place (OOIP).75  Because EOR is relatively expensive, it 
has not been widely deployed in the past.   However, in a world dealing with peak 
conventional oil production and higher oil prices, it has significant potential. 
 
                                                
74Williams, B.  "Progress in IOR technology, economics deemed critical to staving off world's oil 
production peak".  OGJ. August 4, 2003.   
75Williams, B.  "Progress in IOR technology, economics deemed critical to staving off world's oil 
production peak".  OGJ. August 4, 2003; National Research Council.  Fuels to Drive Our Future.  
National Academy Press.  1990.;   "EOR Continues to Unlock Oil Resources".  OGJ.  April 12, 
2004. 
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Because of various cost considerations, enhanced oil recovery processes are 
typically not applied to a conventional oil reservoir until after oil production has 
peaked.  Therefore, EOR is not likely to increase reservoir peak production. 
However, EOR can increase total recoverable conventional oil, and production 
from the reservoirs to which it is applied does not decline as rapidly as would 
otherwise be the case.  This concept is notionally shown in Figure IV-1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure VI-1.  The Timing of EOR Applications 
 
 
C.  Heavy Oil and Oil Sands 
 
This category of unconventional oil includes a variety of viscous oils that are 
called heavy oil, bitumen, oil sands, and tar sands.  These oils have potential to 
play a much larger role in satisfying the world’s needs for liquid fuels in the 
future. 
 
The largest deposits of these oils exist in Canada and Venezuela, with smaller 
resources in Russia, Europe and the U.S.  While the size of the Canadian and 
Venezuela resources are enormous, 3-4 trillion barrels in total, the amount of oil 
estimated to be economically recoverable is of the order of 600 billion barrels.76  
This relatively low fraction is in large part due to the extremely difficult task of 
extracting these oils.77 
 
                                                
76Economists will argue that this amount will increase with higher world oil prices, which is almost 
certainly correct.  However, without careful analysis, estimation of the increased reserves would 
be strictly speculation. 
77These numbers are subject to revision upwards or downwards depending on future geological 
findings, advancing technology, or higher oil prices.  Williams, B.  "Heavy Hydrocarbons Playing 
Key Role in Peak Oil Debate, Future Supply".  OGJ.  July 28, 2003. 
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Canadian oil sands production results in a range of products, only a part of which 
can be refined into finished fuels that can substitute for petroleum-based fuels. 
These high quality oil-sands-derived products are called synthetic crude oil 
(SCO).  Other products from oil sands processing are Dilbit, a blend of diluent 
and bitumen, Synbit, a blend of synthetic crude oil and bitumen, and Syndilbit, a 
blend of Synbit and diluent.  Current Canadian production is approximately 1 
million bpd of which 600,000 bpd is synthetic crude oil and 400,000 bpd is lower 
grade bitumen.78 
 
The reasons why the production of unconventional oils has not been more 
extensive is as follows:  1) Production costs for unconventional oils are typically 
much higher than for conventional oil;  2) Significant quantities of energy are 
required to recover and transport unconventional oils;  and  3)  Unconventional 
oils are of lower quality and, therefore, are more expensive to refine into clean 
transportation fuels than conventional oils. 
 
Canadian oil sands have been in commercial production for decades.  During 
that time, production costs have been reduced considerably, but costs are still 
substantially higher than conventional oil production. Canadian oil sands 
production currently uses large amounts of natural gas for heating and 
processing.  Canada recently recognized that it no longer has the large natural 
gas resources  once thought, so oil sands producers are considering building 
coal or nuclear plants as substitute energy sources to replace natural gas.79  The 
overall efficiency of Canadian oil sands production is not publicly available but 
has been estimated to be less than 70 percent for total product, only a part of 
which is a high-quality substitute transport fuel.80 
 
In addition to needing a substitute for natural gas for processing oil sands, there 
are a number of other major challenges facing the expansion of Canadian oil 
sands production, including water81 and diluent availability, financial capital, and 
environmental issues, such as SOX and NOX emissions, waste water cleanup, 
and brine, coke, and sulfur disposition. In addition, because Canada is a 
signatory to the Kyoto Protocol and because oil sands production results in 
significant CO2 emissions per barrel, there may be related constraints yet to be 
fully evaluated. 
 
The current Canadian vision is to produce a total of about 5 MM bpd of products 
from oil sands by 2030. This is to include about 3 MM bpd of synthetic crude oil 
from which refined fuels can be produced, with the remainder being poorer 
quality bitumen that could be used for energy, power, and/or hydrogen and 
                                                
78 Gray, D.  "Oil Sands Conference Report".  Mitretek.  May 24, 2004. 
79 "Oil Sands Technology Roadmap".  Alberta Chamber of Resources.  January 2004. 
80Gray, D.  "Oil Sands Conference Report".  Mitretek.  May 24, 2004.  
81 Underground steam recovery requires about 3 bbls of water per barrel of recovered bitumen.  
Mining operations need 4-6 bbls of water per bbl of bitumen. Ref.: Gray, D.  Oil Sands 
Conference Report.  Mitretek.  May 24, 2004. 
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petrochemicals production.   5 MM bpd would represent a five-fold increase from 
current levels of production.82  Another estimate of future production states that if 
all proposed oil sands projects proceed on schedule, industry could produce 3.5 
MM bpd by 2017, representing 2 MM bpd of synthetic crude and 1.5 MM bpd of 
unprocessed lower-grade bitumen.83  It should be noted that not everyone 
supports this expansion.  For example, the executive director of the Sierra Club 
of Canada, calls tar sands “… the world's dirtiest source of oil."84 
 
Venezuela’s extra-heavy crude oil and bitumen deposits are situated in the 
Orinoco Belt, located in Central Venezuela. There are currently a number of joint 
ventures between the Venezuelan oil company, PdVSA, and foreign partners to 
develop and produce this oil.  In 2003, production was about 500,000 bpd of 
synthetic crude oil.  That is expected to increase to 600,000 bpd by 2005.85  
While the weather in tropical Venezuela is more conducive to oil production 
operations than the bitter winters of Alberta, Canada, the political climate in 
Venezuela has been particularly unsettled in recent years, which could impact 
future production. 
 
In closing, it is also worth noting that the bitumen yield from oil sands surface 
mining operations is about 0.6 barrels per ton of mined material, excluding 
overburden removal.  This is similar to the yield from a good quality oil shale, but 
is less than Fisher-Tropsch liquid yields from coal, which is about 2.6 barrels per 
ton of coal. 86 
 
D.  Gas-To-Liquids (GTL) 
 
Very large reservoirs of natural gas exist around the world, many in locations 
isolated from gas-consuming markets. Significant quantities of this “stranded 
gas” have been liquefied and transported to various markets in refrigerated, 
pressurized ships in the form of liquefied natural gas (LNG).  Japan, followed by 
Korea, Spain and the U.S. were the largest importers of LNG in 2003. LNG 
accounted for an important fraction of all traded gas volumes in 2003, and that 
fraction is projected to continue to grow considerably in the future.87 
 
Another method of bringing stranded natural gas to world markets is to 
disassociate the methane molecules, add steam, and convert the resultant 
mixture to high quality liquid fuels via the Fisher-Tropsch (F-T) process.  As with 
coal liquefaction, F-T based GTL results in clean, finished fuels, ready for use in 
existing end-use equipment with only modest finishing and blending.  This Gas-
                                                
82"Oil Sands Technology Roadmap".  Alberta Chamber of Resources.  January 2004. 
83Stott, J.  "CERI:  Alberta Oil Sands Industry Outlook ‘Very Robust.’"  OGJ.  March 22, 2004. 
84Jaremko, G.  "Green forces rally to divert oil sands' use of Arctic gas.  Gas use by 2015 could 
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85U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration, "Country Analysis Briefs – 
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To-Liquids process has undergone significant development over the past 
decade.  Shell now operates a 14,500 bpd GTL plant in Malaysia. A number of 
large, new commercial plants recently announced include three large units in 
Qatar -- a 140,000 bpd Shell facility, a 160,000 bpd ConocoPhillips facility, and a 
120,000 bpd Marathon Oil plant.   Projects under development and consideration 
total roughly 1.7 MM bpd, but not all will come to fruition.  Under business-as-
usual conditions, 1.0 MM bpd may be produced by 2015, in line with a recent 
estimate of 600,000 bpd of GTL diesel fuel by 2015 -- the remaining 400,000 bpd 
being gasoline and other products.88 
 
E.  Liquid FueIs from U.S. Domestic Resources  
 
The U.S. has three types of natural resource from which substitute liquid fuels 
can be manufactured:  coal, oil shale, and biomass.  All have been shown 
capable of producing high quality liquid fuels that can supplement or substitute 
for the fuels now produced from petroleum. 
 
To derive liquid fuels from coal, the leading process involves gasification of the 
coal, removal of impurities from the resultant gas, and then synthesis of liquid 
fuels using the Fisher-Tropsch process. Modern gasification technologies have 
been dramatically improved over the years, with the result that over 150 gasifiers 
are in commercial operation around the world, a number operating on coal.  Gas 
cleanup technologies are well developed and utilized in refineries worldwide.  F-T 
synthesis is also well developed and commercially practiced.  A number of coal 
liquefaction plants were built and operated during World War II, and the Sasol 
Company in South Africa subsequently built a number of larger, more modern 
facilities.89  The U.S. has huge coal reserves that are now being utilized for the 
production of electricity; those resources could also provide feedstock for large-
scale liquid fuel production.90  Lastly, coal liquids from gasification/F-T synthesis 
are of such high quality that they do not need to be refined. When co-producing 
electricity, coal liquefaction is a developed technology, currently believed capable 
of providing clean substitute fuels at $30-35 per barrel.91  
 
The U.S. is endowed with a vast resource of oil shale, located primarily in the 
western part of the Lower 48 states with lesser quantities in the mid Atlantic 
region.  Processes for mining shale and retorting it at high temperatures were 
developed intensively in the late 1970s and early 1980s.  However, when oil 
prices decreased in the mid 1980s, all large-scale oil shale R&D was 
terminated.92  
                                                
88Higgins,T.  "Gas-To-Liquids:  An Emerging Driver for Diesel Markets?"  World Refining.  April 
2004. 
89Kruger, P du P.  "Startup Experience at Sasol’s Two and Three".  Sasol.  1983. 
90National Research Council.  Fuels to Drive Our Future.  National Academies Press.  1990. 
91Gray, D. et al. "Coproduction of Ultra Clean Transportation Fuels, Hydrogen, and Electric Power 
from Coal".  Mitretek Systems Technical Report MTR 2001-43, July 2001. 
92Johnson, H. et al.  "Strategic Significance of America’s Oil Shale Resource".  DOE.   March 
2004. 
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The oil shale processing technologies that were pursued in the past required 
large volumes of water, which is now increasingly scarce in the western states.  
Also, air emissions regulations have become much stricter in the ensuing years, 
presenting additional challenges for shale mining and processing.  Finally, it 
should be noted that the oil produced from shale retorting requires refining before 
it can be used as transportation fuels.   
 
In recent years, Shell has been developing a new shale oil recovery process that 
uses insitu heating and avoids mining and massive materials handling.  Little is 
known about the process and its economics, so its potential cannot now be 
evaluated.93  (See Appendix VI for notes on shale oil). 
 
Biomass can be grown, collected and converted to substitute liquid fuels by a 
number of processes.  Currently, biomass-to-ethanol is produced on a large 
scale to provide a gasoline additive.  The market for ethanol derived from 
biomass is influenced by federal requirements and facilitated by generous federal 
and state tax subsidies.  Research holds promise of more economical ethanol 
production from cellulosic (“woody”) biomass, but related processes are far from 
economic. Reducing the cost of growing, harvesting, and converting biomass 
crops will be necessary.94   In other parts of the world, biomass-to-liquid fuels 
might be more attractive, depending on a myriad of factors, including local labor 
costs.  Related projections for large-scale production would be strictly 
speculative.  In summary, there are no developed biomass-to-fuels technologies 
that are now near cost competitive. (See Appendix VI for notes on biomass). 
 
F.  Fuel Switching to Electricity 
 
Electricity is only used to a limited extent in the transportation sector.  Diesel 
fuels (mid-distillates) power most rail trains in the U.S.; only a modest fraction are 
electric powered. Other electric transportation is limited to special situations, 
such as forklifts, in-factory transporters, etc.  
 
In the 1990s electric automobiles were introduced to the market, spurred by a 
California clean vehicle requirement.  The effort was a failure because existing 
batteries did not provide the vehicle range and performance that customers 
demanded.  In the future, electricity storage may improve enough to win 
consumer acceptance of electric automobiles.  In addition, extremely high 
gasoline prices may cause some consumers to find electric automobiles more 
acceptable, especially for around-town use. Such a shift in public preferences is 
unpredictable, so electric vehicles cannot now be projected as a significant offset 
to future gasoline use. 
                                                
93 O’Conner, T.  "Mahogany Research Project:  Technology to Secure Our Future".  Presentation 
at the DOE Shale Peer Review.  February 19-20, 2004. 
94 Smith, S.J. et al.  "Near-Term US Biomass Potential."  PNWD-3285.  Battelle Memorial 
Institute.  January 2004. 
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A larger number of train routes could be outfitted for electric trains, but such a 
transition would likely be slow, because of the need to build additional electric 
power plants, transmission lines, and electric train cars.  Since existing diesel 
locomotives use electric drive, their retrofit might be feasible. However, since 
diesel fuel use in trains is  only roughly 0.3 MM bpd,95 electrification of trains 
would not have a major impact on U.S liquid fuel consumption. 
 
There are no known near-commercial means for electrifying heavy trucks or 
aircraft, so related conversions are not now foreseeable. 
 
G.  Other Fuel Switching  
 
It is conceivable that consumers who now use mid-distillates and LPG (Liquefied 
Petroleum Gas) for heating could switch to natural gas or electricity, thereby 
freeing up liquid fuels for transportation.  Analysis of this path is beyond the 
scope of this study, but it should be noted that these uses represent only a few 
percent of U.S. liquid fuel consumption. Such switching on a large scale would 
require the construction of compensating natural gas and/or electric power 
facilities and infrastructure, which would not happen quickly. In addition, freed-up 
liquids would likely require further refining to meet market and environmental 
requirements.  Related refining would require refinery construction, which would 
also be time consuming. 
 
H.  Hydrogen  
 
Hydrogen has potential as a long-term alternative to petroleum-based liquid fuels 
in some transportation applications. Like electricity, hydrogen is an energy 
carrier; hydrogen production requires an energy source for its production.  
Energy sources for hydrogen production include natural gas, coal, nuclear power, 
and renewables.  Hydrogen can be used in internal combustion engines, similar 
to those in current use, or via chemical reactions in fuel cells. 
 
The Department of Energy is currently conducting a high profile program aimed 
at developing a “hydrogen economy.”96  DOE’s primary emphasis is on hydrogen 
for light duty vehicle application (automobiles and light duty trucks).  Recently, 
the National Research Council (NRC) completed a study that included an 
evaluation of the technical, economic and societal challenges associated with the 
development of a hydrogen economy.97  That study is the basis for the following 
highlights. 
 
                                                
95American Association of Railroads.  Railroad Facts.  2002. 
96"DOE Hydrogen Posture Plan". www.eere.energy.gov/hydrogenandfuelcells. March 10, 2004. 
97National Research Council.  The Hydrogen Economy: Opportunities, Costs, Barriers and R & D 
Needs.  National Academies Press.  2004. 
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A lynchpin of the current DOE hydrogen program is fuel cells.  In order for fuel 
cells to compete with existing petroleum-based internal combustion engines, 
particularly for light duty vehicles, the NRC concluded that fuel cells must 
improve by 1) a factor of 10-20 in cost, 2) a factor of five in lifetime, and 3) 
roughly a factor of two in efficiency.  The NRC did not believe that such 
improvements could be achieved by technology development alone; instead, new 
concepts (breakthroughs) will be required.  In other words, today’s technologies 
do not appear practically viable.98 
 
Because of the need for unpredictable inventions in fuel cells, as well as viable 
means for on-board hydrogen storage, the introduction of commercial hydrogen 
vehicles cannot be predicted.  
 
I.  Factors That Can Cause Delay  
 
It is extremely difficult, expensive, and time consuming to construct any type of 
major energy-related facility in the U.S. today. Even assuming the expenditure of 
substantial time and money, it is not certain that many proposed facilities will 
ever be constructed.  The construction of transmission lines, interim and 
permanent nuclear waste disposal facilities, electric generation plants, waste 
incinerators, oil refineries, LNG terminals, waste recycling facilities, 
petrochemical plants, etc. is increasingly problematic.   
 
What used to be termed the “not-in-my-back-yard” (NIMBY) principle has evolved 
into the “build-absolutely-nothing-anywhere-near-anything” (BANANA) principle, 
which is increasingly being applied to facilities of any type, including low-income 
housing, cellular phone towers, prisons, sports stadiums, water treatment 
facilities, airports, hazardous waste facilities, and even new fire houses.99  
Construction of even a single, relatively innocuous, urgently needed facility can 
easily take more than a decade.  For example, in 1999, King County, 
                                                
98 Ibid. 
99There has been extensive discussion of these problems in the literature; see, for example, 
Management Information Services, Inc., Summary of the Implications of the Environmental 
Justice Movement for EPRI and its Members; prepared for the Electric Power Research Institute, 
1997; K.A Kilmer, G. Anandalingam, and J. Huber, “The Efficiency of Political Mechanisms for 
Siting Nuisance Facilities:  Are Opponents More Likely to Participate Than Supporters?” Journal 
of Real Estate Finance and Economics, vol. 22, 2001; Sheila Foster, “Justice from the Ground 
Up:  Distributive Inequalities, Grassroots Resistance, and the Transformative Politics of the 
Environmental Justice Movement,” California Law Review, vol. 86, no. 4 (1998), pp. 775-841; D. 
Minehard and Z. Neeman, “Effective Siting of Waste Treatment Facilities,” Journal of 
Environmental Economics and Management, vol. 43, 2002, pp. 303-324; Joanne Linnerooth-
Bayer, “Fair Strategies for Siting Hazardous Waste Facilities,” International Institute for Applied 
Systems Analysis, Laxenburg, Austria, May 1999; Don Markley, “Its not NIMBY Anymore, its 
BANANA,” Broadcast Engineering, March 1, 2002; S. Tierney and P. Hibbard, “Siting Power 
Plants in the New Electric Industry Structure:  Lessons From California," The Electric Journal, 
2000, pp. 35-49; Dan Sandoval, “The NIMBY Challenge,” Recycling Today, April 14, 2003; Philip 
Sittleburg, “NIMBY Mindset Looks for Zoning Loopholes,” Fire Chief, February 1, 2002. 
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Washington, initiated the siting process for the Brightwater wastewater treatment 
plant, which it hopes to have operation in 2010.100   
 
The routine processes required for siting energy facilities can be daunting, 
expensive, and time consuming, and if a facility is at all controversial, which is 
almost invariably the case, opponents can often extend the permitting process 
until sponsors terminate their plans.  For example, approval for new, small, 
distributed energy systems requires a minimum of 18 separate steps, requiring 
approval from four federal agencies, 11 state government agencies, and 14 local 
government agencies.101  Opponents of energy facilities routinely exercise their 
right to raise objections and offer alternatives. Intervenors in permitting 
processes may delay decisions and in some cases force outright cancellations, 
although cases do exist in which facilities have been sited quickly.  
 
The implications for U.S. homeland-based mitigation of world oil peaking are 
troubling.  To replace dwindling supplies of conventional oil, large numbers of 
expensive and environmentally intrusive substitute fuel production facilities will 
be required. Under current conditions, it could easily require more than a decade 
to construct a large coal liquefaction plant in the U.S.  The prospects for 
constructing 25-50, with the first ones coming into operation within a three year 
time window are essentially nil.  Absent change, the U.S. may end up on the path 
of least resistance, allowing only a few substitute fuels plants to be built on U.S. 
soil; in the process the U.S. would be adding substitute fuel imports to its  
increasing dependence on imports of conventional oil. 
 
For the U.S. to attain a lower level of dependence on liquid fuel imports after the 
advent of world oil peaking, a major paradigm shift will be required in the current 
approach to the construction of capital-intensive energy facilities.  Federal and 
state governments will have to adopt legislation allowing the acceleration of the 
development of substitute fuels projects from current decade time-scales. During 
World War II, facilities of all types were constructed on a scale and schedules 
that would have previously been inconceivable. In the face of the 1973 energy 
crisis, the Alaska oil pipeline was approved and constructed in record time.102 
 
While world oil peaking poses many dangers for the U.S., it also offers 
substantial opportunities.  The U.S. could emerge as the world’s largest producer 
of substitute liquid fuels, if it were to undertake a massive program to construct 
substitute fuel production facilities on a timely basis.  The nation is ideally 
positioned to do so because it has the world’s largest coal reserves, and it  could 
                                                
100Siting the Brightwater Treatment Facilities:  Site Selection and Screening Activities, King 
County, March 2001. 
101U.S. Department of Energy, Environmental Siting Guide, Office of Energy Efficiency and 
Renewable Energy, 2004. 
102On the other hand, even in the midst of the energy crisis, the Alaska oil pipeline was approved 
by only one vote in the U.S. Senate and, currently, EIA anticipates that an Alaska gas pipeline will 
not be completed prior to 2020 – see U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2004 Annual 
Energy Outlook, February, 2004. 
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muster the required capital, technology, and labor to implement such a program.  
However, unless a process is developed to expedite plant construction, this 
opportunity could easily slip away.  Other nations, such as China, India, Japan, 
Korea, and others also have the capabilities needed to construct and operate 
such plants.  Under current conditions,  other countries are able to bring such 
large energy projects on-line much more rapidly than the U.S.  Such countries 
could conceivably even import U.S. coal, convert it to liquid fuels products, and 
then export finished product back to the U.S. and elsewhere. 
 
The U.S. has well-developed coal mining, transportation, and shipping systems 
that move coal to the highest bidders, be they domestic or international.  As 
recently as 1981, 14 percent of U.S. coal production was exported.103   While that 
number has declined in recent years, the U.S. could easily expand its current 
coal exports many fold to provide feedstock for coal liquefaction plants in other 
nations.  Not only would the U.S. be dependent on foreign sources for 
conventional oil, which  will continue to dwindle in volume after peaking, but it 
could also become dependant on foreign sources for substitute fuels derived 
from U.S. coal.  
 
                                                
103U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration, Monthly Energy Review, 2004. 
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VII. A WORLD PROBLEM  
 
Oil is essential to all countries.  In 2002 daily consumption ranged from almost 20 
million barrels in the U.S. to 20 barrels in the tiny South Pacific island of Niue, 
population 2,400.104   
 
Oil is produced in 123 countries. The top 20 producing countries provide over 83 
percent of total world oil.  Production by the largest producers is shown in Table 
VII-1.105  The table also lists the top 20 oil-consuming countries and their 
respective consumption.  In total, the top 20 countries consume over 75 percent 
of the average daily production.  Beyond these larger consumers, oil is also 
utilized in all the world’s 194 remaining countries.  
 
Table VII.1.Top World Oil Producing and Consuming Countries - 2002 
 
Producers  Consumers        
  Rank Country MM 
bpd 
Percent  Rank Country MM     
bpd 
Percent 
       1 United States     9.0    11.7       1 United States   19.8    25.3 
       2 Saudi Arabia     8.7    11.3       2 Japan     5.3      6.8 
       3 Russia     7.7    10.0       3 China     5.2      6.6 
       4 Mexico     3.6      4.7       4 Germany     2.7      3.5 
       5 Iran     3.5      4.6       5 Russia     2.6      3.3 
       6 China     3.5      4.6       6 India     2.2      2.8 
       7 Norway     3.3      4.3       7 Korea, South     2.2      2.8 
       8 Canada     2.9      3.8       8 Brazil     2.2      2.8 
       9 Venezuela     2.9      3.8       9 Canada     2.1      2.7 
     10 United Kingdom     2.6      3.3     10 France     2.0      2.5 
     11 United Arab 
Emirates 
    2.4      3.1     11 Mexico     2.0      2.5 
     12 Nigeria     2.1      2.8     12 Italy     1.8      2.4 
13 Iraq 2.0 2.7  13 United Kingdom 1.7 2.2 
14 Kuwait 2.0 2.6  14 Saudi Arabia 1.5 1.9 
15 Brazil 1.8 2.3  15 Spain 1.5 1.9 
16 Algeria 1.6 2.0  16 Iran 1.3 1.7 
17 Libya 1.4 1.8  17 Indonesia 1.1 1.4 
18 Indonesia 1.4 1.8  18 Taiwan 0.9 1.2 
19 Kazakhstan 0.9 1.2  19 Netherlands 0.9 1.1 
20 Oman 0.9 1.2  20 Australia 0.9 1.1 
 103 other 
countries 
12.6    16.3   194 other 
countries 
  18.4 
 
23.5 
 
                                                
104U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration.  "Table 1.2  World Petroleum 
Consumption, 1980-2002" database and "Table G.2  World Production of Crude Oil, NGPL, Other 
Liquids, and Refinery Processing Gain 1980-2002" database, 2004.  
105 Ibid 
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VIII.  THREE MITIGATION SCENARIOS  
 
A.  Introduction 
 
Issues related to the peaking of world oil production are extremely complex, 
involve literally trillions of dollars and are very time-dependent.  To explore these 
matters, we selected three mitigation scenarios for analysis: 
 
• Scenario I assumes that action is not initiated until peaking occurs.   
• Scenario II assumes that action is initiated 10 years before peaking.  
• Scenario III assumes action is initiated 20 years before peaking.   
 
Our approach is simplified in order to provide transparency and promote 
understanding.  Our estimates are approximate, but the mitigation envelope that 
results is believed to be indicative of the realities of such an enormous 
undertaking.  
 
 
B.  Mitigation Options 
 
Our focus is on large-scale, physical mitigation, as opposed to policy actions, e.g. 
tax credits, rationing, automobile speed restrictions, etc. We define physical 
mitigation as 1) implementation of technologies that can substantially reduce the 
consumption of liquid fuels (improved fuel efficiency) while still delivering 
comparable service and 2) the construction and operation of facilities that yield  
large quantities of liquid fuels.   
 
C.  Mitigation Phase-In 
 
The pace that governments and industry chose to mitigate the negative impacts 
of the peaking of world oil production is to be determined.. As a limiting case, we 
choose overnight  go-ahead decision-making for all actions, i.e., crash programs. 
Our rationale is that in a sudden disaster situation, crash programs are most 
likely to be quickly implemented.  Overnight  go-ahead decision-making is most 
probable in our Scenario I, which assumes no action prior to the onset of 
peaking.  By assuming overnight implementation in all three of our scenarios, we 
avoid the arduous and potentially arbitrary challenge of developing a more likely, 
real world decision-making sequence. This is obviously an optimistic assumption 
because government and corporate decision-making is never instantaneous.   
 
 
D.  The Use of Wedges 
 
The model chosen to illustrate the possible effects of likely mitigation actions 
involves the use of "delayed wedges" to approximate the scale and pace of each  
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action.  The use of wedges was effectively utilized in a recent paper by Pacala 
and Socolow.106   
 
Our wedges are composed of two parts.  The first is the preparation time needed 
prior to tangible market penetration.  In the case of efficient transportation, this 
time is required to redesign vehicles and retool factories to produce more 
efficient vehicles.  In the case of the production of substitute fuels, the delay is 
associated with planning and construction of relevant facilities.   
 
After the preparation phase, our wedges then approximate the penetration of 
mitigation effects into the marketplace.  This might be the growing sales of more 
fuel-efficient vehicles or the growing production of substitute fuels.  Our wedge 
pattern is shown in Figure VIII-1, where the horizontal axis is time and the vertical 
axis is market impact, measured in barrels per day of savings or production.  The 
figure is bounded on the right side for illustrative purposes only.  We assume our 
wedges continue to expand for a few decades, which simplifies illustration but is 
increasingly less realistic over time because markets will adjust and impact rates 
will change.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure VIII-1.  Delayed wedge approximation for various mitigation options 
 
 
How our delayed wedges approximate reality is illustrated in Figure VIII-2, which 
shows possible fuel savings associated with implementation of significant new 
Corporate Average Fuel Efficiency (CAFE) standards.107  
                                                
106 Pacala, S., Socolow, R. "Stabilization Wedges:  Solving the Climate Problem for the Next 50 
Years with Current Technologies.”  Science.  August 13, 2004. 
107 These potential savings are documented in National Research Council, National Academy of 
Sciences, Effectiveness and Impact of Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) Standards, 
Washington, D.C.:  National Academy Press, 2002; Management Information Services, Inc., and 
20/20 Vision, Fuel Standards and Jobs:  Economic, Employment, Energy, and Environmental 
Impacts of Increased CAFE Standards Through 2020, report prepared for the Energy Foundation, 
San Francisco, California, July 2002; David L. Greene and John DeCicco, Engineering-Economic 
Analysis of Automotive Fuel Economy Potential in the United States, paper presented at the IEA 
International Workshop on Technologies to Reduce Greenhouse Gas Emissions, Washington, 
D.C., May 1999; David Friedman, et al, Drilling in Detroit: Tapping Automaker Ingenuity to Build 
Safe and Efficient Automobiles, Union of Concerned Scientists, UCS Publications, Cambridge, 
MA, June 2001; Roland Hwang, Bryanna Millis, and Theo Spencer, Clean Getaway:  Toward 
Safe and Efficient Vehicles, Natural Resources Defense Council: New York, July 2001; Brent D. 
Yacobucci, Marc Ross, Technical Options for Improving the Fuel Economy of U.S. Cars and Light 
Prepare Implement 
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Our aim is to approximate reality in a simple manner. Greater detail is beyond the 
scope of this study and would require in-depth analysis.  
 
E. Criteria for Wedge Selection 
 
Our criteria for selecting candidates for our energy saving and substitute oil 
production wedges were as follows: 
 
1. The option must produce liquid fuels that can, as produced or as refined, 
substitute for liquid fuels currently in widespread use, e.g. gasoline, jet 
fuel, diesel, etc.  The end products will thus be compatible with existing 
distribution systems and end-use equipment. 
 
2. The option must be capable of liquid fuels savings or production on a 
massive scale – ultimately millions to tens of millions of barrels per day 
worldwide. 
 
3. The option must include technology that is commercial or near 
commercial, which at a minimum requires that the process has been 
demonstrated at commercial scale.  For production technologies, this 
means that at least one plant has operated at greater than 10,000 bpd for 
at least two years, and product prices from the process are less than 
                                                                                                                                            
Trucks by 2010-2015, American Council for an Energy Efficient Economy, July 2001; Robert L 
Bamberger, Automobile and Light Truck Fuel Economy:  Is CAFE Up to Standards?  Washington, 
D.C.:  Congressional Research Service, September 29, 2001; Energy and Environmental 
Analysis, Inc.  Technology and Cost of Future Fuel Economy Improvements for Light-Duty 
Vehicles, prepared for the National Research Council, 2001. 
 
 
Figure VII-2. The delayed wedge approximation in the case of 
major changes in transportation fuel consumption 
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$50/barrel in 2004 dollars.  For fuels efficiency technologies, the 
technology must have at least entered the commercial market by 2004. 
 
4. Substitute fuel production technologies must be inherently energy efficient, 
which we assume to mean that greater than 50 percent of process energy 
input is contained in the clean liquid fuels product.108 
 
5. The option must be environmentally clean by 2004 standards. 
 
6. While domestic resources are of greatest interest to the U.S., the oil 
market is international, so substitute fuel feedstocks not abundantly 
available in the U.S. must also be considered, e.g. heavy oil/tar sands and 
gas-to-liquids. 
 
7. Energy sources or energy efficiency technologies that produce or save 
electricity are not of interest in this context because commercial processes 
to convert electricity to clean hydrocarbon fuels do not currently exist. 
 
F.  Wedges Selected & Rejected 
 
The combination of technologies, processes, and feedstocks that meet these 
criteria are as follows: 
 
1.  Fuel efficient transportation,  
2.  Heavy oil/Oil sands,  
3.  Coal liquefaction,  
4.  Enhanced oil recovery,    
5.  Gas-to-liquids. 
 
In the end-use category, a dramatic increase in the efficiency of petroleum-based 
fuel equipment is one attractive option.  As previously described, the imposition 
of CAFE requirements for automobile in 1975 was one of the most effective of 
the government mandates initiated in response to the 1973-74 oil embargo.  In 
recent years, fuel economy for automobiles has not been a high national priority 
in the U.S.  Nevertheless, a new hybrid engine technology has been phasing into 
the automobile and truck markets.  In a period of national oil emergency, hybrid 
technology could be massively implemented for new vehicle applications.  Hybrid 
technologies offer fuel economy improvements of 40 percent or more for 
automobiles and light-medium trucks – no other engine technologies offer such 
large, near-term fuel economy benefits.109 
                                                
108 The choice of a minimum is subjective.  A minimum of 50 percent seems reasonable, but a 
higher rate is clearly more desirable. 
109 While diesel engines offer significant improvements in fuel economy over gasoline engines, 
their benefits are notably less than hybrids.  For simplicity, we neglect the broader use of diesels 
in this study, which is not meant to imply that they might indeed make an important contribution in 
the LDV markets. 
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The fuels production options that we chose are heavy oil/tar sands, coal 
liquefaction, improved oil recovery, and gas-to-liquids.  Our rationale was as 
follows: 
 
1. Enhanced Oil Recovery is applicable worldwide. 
 
2. Heavy oil / Oil sands is currently commercial in Canada and Venezuela.  
 
3. Coal liquefaction is a well-developed, near-commercial technology. 
 
4. Gas-To-Liquids is commercially applicable where natural gas is remote from   
markets. 
 
We excluded a number of options for various reasons.  While the U.S. has a 
huge resource of shale oil that could be processed into substitute liquid fuels, the 
technology to accomplish that task is not now ready for deployment.  Because 
various shale oil processing prototypes were developed in years past and 
because shale oil processing is likely to be economically attractive, a concerted 
effort to develop shale oil technology could well lead to shale oil becoming a 
contributor in Scenarios II or III.  However, that would require the initiation of a 
major R & D program in the near future. 
 
Biomass options capable of producing liquid fuels were also excluded.  Ethanol 
from biomass is currently utilized in the transportation market, not because it is 
commercially competitive, but because it is mandated and highly subsidized.  
Biodiesel fuel is a subject of considerable current interest but it too is not yet 
commercially viable.  Again, a major R & D effort might change the biomass 
outlook, if initiated in the near future.110 
 
Over 45% of world oil consumption is for non-transportation uses. Fuel switching 
away from non-transportation uses of liquid fuels is likely to occur, mimicking 
shifts that have already taken place in the U.S. The time frame for such shifts is 
uncertain.  For significant world scale impact, alternate large energy facilities 
would have to be constructed to provide the substitute energy, and that facility 
construction would require the kind of decade-scale time periods required for oil 
peaking mitigation.  
 
Nuclear power, wind and photovoltaics produce electric power, which is not a 
near-term substitute fuel in transportation equipment that requires liquid fuels.  In 
                                                
110 In their recently published hydrogen study, the National Research Council has shown that 
hydrogen from biomass is roughly three times as expensive as coal-based hydrogen.  This 
relationship holds roughly for liquids production, another basis for not considering biomass fuels 
as acceptable under our criteria. See National Research Council, National Academy of Sciences, 
The Hydrogen Economy:  Opportunities, Costs, Barriers, and R&D Needs, Washington, D.C.:  
National Academy Press, 2004 
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the many-decade future after oil peaking, it is conceivable that a massive shift 
from liquid fuels to electricity might occur in some applications.  However, 
consideration of such changes would be speculative at this time.  
 
It is possible that technology innovations resulting from aggressive future 
research may well change the outlook for  various technologies in the future.  Our 
focus on  the currently viable is in no way intended to prejudice other future 
options  We have chosen not to add a wedge for undefined technologies that 
might result from accelerated research, because such a wedge would be purely 
speculative.  No matter what the new technology(s), implementation delay times 
and contribution growth rates will inherently be of the same order of magnitude of 
the technologies that we have considered, because of the inherent scale of all 
physical mitigation. 
 
G. Modeling World Oil Supply / Demand 
 
It is not possible to predict with certainty when world conventional oil peaking will 
occur or how rapidly production will decline after the peak.  To develop our 
scenarios, we utilize the U.S. Lower 48 production pattern as a surrogate for the 
world. This assumption is justified on the basis that Lower 48 oil production 
represents what really happened in a large, complex oil province over the course 
of decades of modern oil production development.   
 
Our starting point is the triangular pattern of production increase followed by 
production decline shown in Figure II-2. Our horizontal axis is centered on the 
year of peaking (the date is not specified) and spans plus and minus two 
decades.  For this study, our vertical axis is pegged at a peak world oil 
production of 100 MM bpd, which is 18 MM bpd above the current 82 MM bpd 
world production.  If peaking were to occur soon, 100 MM bpd might be high by 
20 percent.  If peaking were to occur at 125 MM bpd at some future date, the 100 
MM bpd assumption would be low by 20 percent.  Since the estimates in our 
wedges are rough under any conditions, a 100 MM bpd peak represents a 
credible assumption for this kind of analysis.  The selection of 100 MM bpd is not 
intended as a prediction of magnitude or timing; its use is for illustration purposes 
only. 
 
Next is the important issue of the slopes of the production profile showing the 
rate of growth of production/demand before peaking and the subsequent decline 
in production. The World Energy Council stated: “Oil demand is projected to 
increase at about 1.9 percent per year rising from about 75.7 million b/d in 2000  
(actual) to 113-115 million b/d in 2020 – an increase of about 37.5-39.5 million 
b/d.”111   Recent trends indicate a 3+ percent world oil demand growth, driven in 
part by rapidly increasing oil consumption in China and India.  However, a 3+ 
percent growth rate on a continuing basis seems excessive.  On this basis, we 
                                                
111 "Hydrocarbon Resources: Future Supply and Demand."  World Energy Council - 18 th 
Congress, Buenos Aires, October 2001. 
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assume a two percent demand growth before peaking, and we assume an 
intrinsic two percent long-run hypothetical, healthy economy demand after 
peaking.  This extrapolation of demand after peaking provides a reference that 
facilitates calculation of supply shortfalls.  The assumption has the benefit of 
simplicity, but it ignores the real-world feedback of oil price escalation on 
demand, which is sure to happen but the calculation thereof will be complicated 
and was beyond the scope of this study. 
 
Estimating a decline rate after world oil production peaking is a difficult issue.  
While human activity dominates the demand for oil, the “rocks” (geology) will 
dominate the decline of world conventional oil production after peaking.  
Referring to U.S. Lower 48 production history, the decline after the 1970 peaking 
was roughly 1.7 percent per year, which we have chosen to round off to two 
percent per year as our estimated world conventional oil decline rate.112  It should 
be noted that other analysts have projected decline rates of 3-8%, which would 
make the mitigation problem much more difficult.113 
 
H. Our Wedges 
 
In Appendix IV we develop the sizes of the wedges that we believe appropriate 
for our trends analysis.  The categories, delays and 10-year estimated impacts 
are shown in Figure VIII-3.  Once again, bear in mind that these are rough 
approximations aimed at illustrating the inherently large scale of mitigation. 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure VIII-3.  Assumed wedges 
 
                                                
112 Compounding starts at 67.3 MM bpd at –20 years, rises to 100 MM bpd at year 0, and drops 
to 66.8 MM bpd at +20 years. 
113 See for instance Al-Husseini, S.I. , Retired Exec. V.P., Saudi Aramco.  A Producer’s 
Perspective on the Oil Industry.  Oil and Money Conference.  London.  October 26, 2004;   
Hakes, J.  Long Term World Oil Supply.  EIA.  April 18, 2000; and ExxonMobil.  A Report on 
Energy Trends, Greenhouse Emissions and Alternate Energy.  February 2004. 
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I.     The Three Scenarios 
 
As noted, our three scenarios are benchmarked to the unknown date of peaking: 
 
• Scenario I:    Mitigation begins at the time of peaking;   
• Scenario II:   Mitigation starts 10 years before peaking;   
• Scenario III:  Mitigation starts 20 years before peaking. 
 
Our mitigation choices then map onto our assumed world oil peaking pattern as 
shown in Figures VIII-4, 5 and 6. 
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Figure VIII-4.  Mitigation crash programs started at the time of world 
oil peaking:  A significant supply shortfall occurs over the forecast 
period. 
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Figure VIII-5.  Mitigation crash programs started 10 years before world oil 
peaking:  A moderate supply shortfall occurs after roughly 10 years. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure VIII-6.  Mitigation crash programs started 20 years before world oil 
peaking:  No supply shortfall occurs during the forecast period. 
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J.     Observations & Conclusions on Scenarios 
 
This exercise was conducted bottom – up; we estimated reasonable potential 
contributions from each viable option, summed them, and then applied them to 
our assumed world oil peaking pattern.   
 
While our option contribution estimates are clearly approximate, in total they 
probably represent a realistic portrayal of what might be achieved with an array 
of physical mitigation options.  Together, implementation of all of the specified 
options would provide 15 – 20 MM bpd impact, ten years after simultaneous 
initiation.   Roughly 90 percent would result from substitute liquid fuel production 
and roughly ten percent would come from transportation fuel efficiency 
improvements.   
 
Our results are congruent with the fundamentals of the problem:  
 
• Waiting until world oil production peaks before taking crash program action 
leaves the world with a significant liquid fuel deficit for more than two 
decades. 
 
• Initiating a mitigation crash program 10 years before world oil peaking helps 
considerably but still leaves a liquid fuels shortfall roughly a decade after the 
time that oil would have peaked. 
 
• Initiating a mitigation crash program 20 years before peaking appears to offer 
the possibility of avoiding a world liquid fuels shortfall for the forecast period. 
 
The obvious conclusion from this analysis is that with adequate, timely mitigation, 
the costs of peaking can be minimized.  If mitigation were to be too little, too late, 
world supply/demand balance will be achieved through massive demand 
destruction (shortages), which would translate to significant economic hardship, 
as discussed earlier. 
 
K. Risk Management 
 
It is possible that peaking may not occur for several decades, but it is also 
possible that peaking may occur in the near future.  We are thus faced with a  
daunting risk management problem: 
 
• On the one hand, mitigation initiated soon would be premature if 
peaking is still several decades away. 
 
• On the other hand, if peaking is imminent, failure to initiate mitigation  
quickly will have significant economic and social costs to the U.S. and 
the world. 
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The two risks are asymmetric: 
 
• Mitigation actions initiated prematurely will be costly and could result in 
a  poor use of resources. 
 
• Late initiation of mitigation may result in severe consequences.  
 
The world has never confronted a problem like this, and the failure to act on a 
timely basis could have debilitating impacts on the world economy. Risk 
minimization requires the implementation of mitigation measures well prior to 
peaking.  Since it is uncertain when peaking will occur, the challenge is indeed 
significant. 
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IX.  MARKET SIGNALS AS PEAKING IS APPROACHED  
 
As world oil peaking is approached and demand for conventional oil begins to 
exceed supply, oil prices will rise steeply.  As discussed in Chapter IV, related 
price increases are almost certain to have negative impacts on the U.S. and 
world economies. Another likely signal is substantially increased oil price 
volatility.  
 
Oil prices have traditionally been volatile.  Causes include political events, 
weather, labor strikes, infrastructure problems, and fears of terrorism.114  In an 
era where supply was adequate to meet demand and where there was excess 
production capacity in OPEC, those effects were relatively short-lived.  However, 
as world oil peaking is approached, excess production capacity by definition will 
disappear, so that even minor supply disruptions will cause increased price 
volatility as traders, speculators, and other market participants react to 
supply/demand events. Simultaneously, oil storage inventories are likely to 
decrease, further eroding security of supply, aggravating price volatility, and 
further stimulating speculation.115 
 
While it is recognized that high oil prices will have adverse effects, the effects of 
increased price volatility may not be sufficiently appreciated.  Higher oil price 
volatility can lead to reduction in investment in other parts of the economy, 
leading in turn to a long-term reduction in supply of various goods, higher prices, 
and further reduced macroeconomic activity.  Increasing volatility has the 
potential to increase both economic disruption and transaction costs for both 
consumers and producers, adding to inflation and reducing economic growth 
rates.116  
 
The most relevant experience was during the 1970s and early 1980s, when oil 
prices increased  roughly six-fold and oil price volatility was aggravated.  Those 
reactions have often been dismissed as a “panic response,” but that experience 
may nevertheless be a good indicator of the oil price volatility to be expected 
when demand exceeds supply after oil peaking.117  
                                                
114Over the past 20 years, oil prices have been extremely volatile.  Between 1982 and 2002, the 
standard deviation in monthly oil prices was 29.5 percent of its mean. The only other major 
commodity whose price exhibited similar volatility was coffee – 27.8 percent of its mean.  See 
Andre Plourde and G.C. Watkins, “Crude Oil Prices Between 1985 and 1994:  How Volatile in 
Relation to Other Commodities?” Resource and Energy Economics, Vol. 20, 1998, pp. 245-262.  
In general, Plourde and Watkins found that oil prices fluctuated more or at least as much as the 
most volatile of commodity prices; see the discussion in Hillard Huntington, “Energy Disruptions, 
Interfirm Price Effects, and the Aggregate Economy,” Stanford Energy Modeling Forum, 
September 2002. 
115International Energy Agency, “IEA Expresses Concern About High Oil Prices as it Celebrates 
its 30th Anniversary,” Istanbul, April 2004; International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook 
Report, September 2003. 
116Walter C. Labys, Globalization, Oil Price Volatility, and the U.S. Economy, 2001. 
117Vincente Ramirez, “Oil Crises Delay – a World Oil Price Forecast,” REXplore Zachasumsc, 
Switzerland, July 1999. 
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The factors that cause oil price escalation and volatility could be further 
exacerbated by terrorism.  For example, in the summer of 2004, it was estimated 
that the threat of terrorism had added a premium of 25 - 33 percent to the price of 
a barrel of oil.118  As world oil peaking is approached, it is not difficult to imagine 
that the terrorism premium could increase even more.  
 
In conclusion, oil peaking will not only lead to higher oil prices but also to 
increased oil price volatility.  In the process, oil could become the price setter in 
the broader energy market, in which case other energy prices could well become 
increasingly volatile and unpredictable.119 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
118John Schoen, “Oil Prices Include a Growing Risk Premium," Business with MSNBC, Oil and 
Energy News, May 12, 2004. 
119Jean-Marie Bourdaire, “Energy Supply Conditions and Oil Price Regime,” presented at the 
Association for the Study of Peak Oil, Paris, May 2003. 
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X.  WILDCARDS  
 
There are a number of factors that could conceivably impact the peaking of world 
oil production.  Here is a list of possible upsides and downsides. 
 
A.  Upsides – Things That Might Ease the Problem of World Oil Peaking 
 
• The pessimists are wrong again and peaking does not occur for many 
decades. 
• Middle East oil reserves are much higher than publicly stated. 
• A number of new super-giant oil fields are found and brought into 
production, well before oil peaking might otherwise have occurred. 
• High world oil prices over a sustained period (a decade or more) induce a 
higher level of structural conservation and energy efficiency. 
• The U.S. and other nations decide to institute significantly more stringent 
fuel efficiency standards well before world oil peaking. 
• World economic and population growth slows and future demand is much 
less than anticipated. 
• China and India decide to institute vehicle efficiency standards and other 
energy efficiency requirements, reducing the rate of growth of their oil 
requirements. 
• Oil prices stay at a high enough level on a sustained basis so that industry 
begins construction of substitute fuels plants well before oil peaking.   
• Huge new reserves of natural gas are discovered, a portion of which is 
converted to liquid fuels. 
• Some kind of scientific breakthrough comes into commercial use, 
mitigating oil demand well before oil production peaks. 
 
B.  Downsides - Things That Might Exacerbate the Problem of World Oil       
Peaking 
 
• World oil production peaking is occurring now or will happen soon. 
• Middle East reserves are much less than stated. 
• Terrorism stays at current levels or increases and concentrates on 
damaging oil production, transportation, refining and distribution. 
• Political instability in major oil producing countries results in unexpected, 
sustained world-scale oil shortages. 
• Market signals and terrorism delay the realization of peaking, delaying the 
initiation of mitigation. 
• Large-scale, sustained Middle East political instability hinders oil 
production.  
• Consumers demand even larger, less fuel-efficient cars and SUVs. 
• Expansion of energy production is hindered by increasing environmental 
challenges, creating shortages beyond just liquid fuels. 
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XI.  SUMMARY AND  CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
 
Our analysis leads to the following conclusions and final thoughts. 
 
1.  World Oil Peaking is Going to Happen  
 
World production of conventional oil will reach a maximum and decline 
thereafter.  That maximum is called the peak. A number of competent 
forecasters project peaking within a decade; others contend it will occur 
later.  Prediction of the peaking is extremely difficult because of geological 
complexities, measurement problems, pricing variations, demand elasticity, 
and political influences.  Peaking will happen, but the timing is uncertain. 
 
2.  Oil Peaking Could Cost the U.S. Economy Dearly 
 
Over the past century the development of the U.S. economy and lifestyle 
has been fundamentally shaped by the availability of abundant, low-cost oil.  
Oil scarcity and several-fold oil price increases due to world oil production 
peaking could have dramatic impacts. The decade after the onset of world 
oil peaking may resemble the period after the 1973-74 oil embargo, and the 
economic loss to the United States could be measured on a trillion-dollar 
scale.  Aggressive, appropriately timed fuel efficiency and substitute fuel 
production could provide substantial mitigation.  
 
3.  Oil Peaking Presents a Unique Challenge 
 
The world has never faced a problem like this. Without massive mitigation 
more than a decade before the fact, the problem will be pervasive and will 
not be temporary.  Previous energy transitions (wood to coal and coal to oil) 
were gradual and evolutionary; oil peaking will be abrupt and revolutionary.  
 
4.  The Problem is Liquid Fuels  
 
Under business-as-usual conditions, world oil demand will continue 
to grow, increasing approximately two percent per year for the next few 
decades.  This growth will be driven primarily by the transportation sector.  
The economic and physical lifetimes of existing transportation equipment 
are measured on decade time-scales.  Since turnover rates are low, rapid 
changeover in transportation end-use equipment is inherently impossible. 
 
Oil peaking represents a liquid fuels problem, not an “energy crisis” in the 
sense that term has been used.  Motor vehicles, aircraft, trains, and ships 
simply have no ready alternative to liquid fuels.  Non-hydrocarbon-based 
energy sources, such as solar, wind, photovoltaics, nuclear power, 
geothermal, fusion, etc. produce electricity, not liquid fuels, so their 
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widespread use in transportation is at best decades away.  Accordingly, 
mitigation of declining world oil production must be narrowly focused.  
  
5.  Mitigation Efforts Will Require Substantial Time 
  
Mitigation will require an intense effort over decades.  This inescapable 
conclusion is based on the time required to replace vast numbers of liquid 
fuel consuming vehicles and the time required to build a substantial number 
of substitute fuel production facilities. Our scenarios analysis shows: 
 
• Waiting until world oil production peaks before taking crash program 
action would leave the world with a significant liquid fuel deficit for more 
than two decades. 
 
• Initiating a mitigation crash program 10 years before world oil peaking 
helps considerably but still leaves a liquid fuels shortfall roughly a decade 
after the time that oil would have peaked. 
 
• Initiating a mitigation crash program 20 years before peaking appears to 
offer the possibility of avoiding a world liquid fuels shortfall for the forecast 
period. 
 
The obvious conclusion from this analysis is that with adequate, timely 
mitigation, the economic costs to the world can be minimized.  If mitigation 
were to be too little, too late, world supply/demand balance will be achieved 
through massive demand destruction (shortages), which would translate to 
significant economic hardship. 
 
There will be no quick fixes.  Even crash programs will require more than a 
decade to yield substantial relief. 
 
6.  Both Supply and Demand Will Require Attention 
   
Sustained high oil prices will stimulate some level of forced demand 
reduction.  Stricter end-use efficiency requirements can further reduce 
embedded demand, but substantial, world-scale change will require a 
decade or more.  Production of large amounts of substitute liquid fuels can 
and must be provided.  A number of commercial or near-commercial 
substitute fuel production technologies are currently available, so the 
production of large amounts of substitute liquid fuels is technically and 
economically feasible, albeit time-consuming and expensive. 
 
7. It Is a Matter of Risk Management 
 
The peaking of world conventional oil production presents a classic risk 
management problem: 
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• Mitigation efforts initiated earlier than required may turn out 
to be premature, if peaking is long delayed.  
• On the other hand, if peaking is imminent, failure to initiate 
timely mitigation could be extremely damaging. 
 
Prudent risk management requires the planning and implementation of 
mitigation well before peaking.  Early mitigation will almost certainly be less 
expensive and less damaging to the world’s economies than delayed 
mitigation.  
 
 
8.  Government Intervention Will be Required 
 
Intervention by governments will be required, because the economic and 
social implications of oil peaking would otherwise be chaotic. The 
experiences of the 1970s and 1980s offer important lessons and guidance 
as to government actions that might be more or less desirable.  But the 
process will not be easy.  Expediency may require major changes to 
existing administrative and regulatory procedures such as lengthy 
environmental reviews and lengthy public involvement. 
 
9.  Economic Upheaval is Not Inevitable 
 
Without mitigation, the peaking of world oil production will almost certainly 
cause major economic upheaval.  However, given enough lead-time, the 
problems are soluble with existing technologies.  New technologies are 
certain to help but on a longer time scale.  Appropriately executed risk 
management could dramatically minimize the damages that might otherwise 
occur. 
 
10. More Information is Needed 
 
The most effective action to combat the peaking of world oil production 
requires better understanding of a number of issues.  Is it possible to have 
relatively clear signals as to when peaking might occur?  It would be 
desirable to have potential mitigation actions better defined with respect to 
cost, potential capacity, timing, etc. Various risks and possible benefits of 
possible mitigation actions need to be examined. (See Appendix V for a list 
of possible follow-on studies). 
 
 
The purpose of this analysis was to identify the critical issues surrounding the 
occurrence and mitigation of world oil production peaking.  We simplified many of 
the complexities in an effort to provide a transparent analysis.  Nevertheless, our 
study is neither simple nor brief.  We recognize that when oil prices escalate 
dramatically, there will be demand and economic impacts that will alter our 
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simplified analysis.  Consideration of those feedbacks will be a daunting task but 
one that should be undertaken. 
 
Our study required that we make a number of assumptions and estimates.  We 
well recognize that in-depth analyses may yield different numbers. Nevertheless, 
this analysis clearly demonstrates that the key to mitigation of world oil 
production peaking will be the construction a large number of substitute fuel 
production facilities, coupled to significant increases in transportation fuel 
efficiency. The time required to mitigate world oil production peaking is measured 
on a decade time-scale, and related production facility size is large and capital 
intensive.  How and when governments decide to address these challenges is 
yet to be determined.  
 
Our focus on existing commercial and near-commercial mitigation technologies 
illustrates that a number of technologies are currently ready for immediate and 
extensive implementation. Our analysis was not meant to be limiting.  We believe 
that future research will provide additional mitigation options, some possibly 
superior to those we considered.  Indeed, it would be appropriate to greatly 
accelerate public and private oil peaking mitigation research.  However, the 
reader must recognize that doing the research required to bring new 
technologies to commercial readiness takes time under the best of 
circumstances.  Thereafter, more than a decade of intense implementation will 
be required for world scale impact, because of the inherently large scale of world 
oil consumption. 
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APPENDIX I.  MOST MEANINGFUL EIA OIL PEAKING CASE 
 
In the year 2000, EIA developed 12 scenarios for world oil production peaking 
using three U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) estimates of the world conventional 
oil resource base (Low, Expected, and High) and four annual world oil demand 
growth rates (0, 1, 2, and 3 percent per year).120  We believe the most likely of 
the EIA scenarios is the one based on the USGS expected ultimate world 
recoverable oil of 3,003 billion barrels coupled with a 2% annual world oil 
demand escalation. 
 
Figure A-I shows the two EIA scenarios based on these assumptions. The 
difference between the two profiles is attributable to two assumed production 
decay rates following peak production.  Both curves assume a 2 percent per year 
growth from the year 2000 until the peak.  One scenario assumes a 2 percent 
decline after the world oil production peak, while the other assumes a steeper 
drop after the world oil production peak.  Because the areas under both curves 
must equal the projected 3,003 billion barrels of recoverable conventional oil from 
the year 2000 forward, the rapid decay curve will inherently yield the later 
occurring, higher world oil production peak. 
 
The EIA scenario that peaks in 2016 looks like the relatively symmetric U.S. 
Lower 48 production profile in Figure II-2.  The EIA scenario that peaks in 2037 
not only differs dramatically from the U.S. experience, it differs from typical 
individual oil reservoir experience, which often displays a relatively symmetric 
production profile, not the sharp drop illustrated  in the alternate EIA case.  On 
this basis, we believe that the EIA 2016 peaking case appears much more 
credible than the 2037 peaking case.  The associated 21-year difference 
between the two predicted production peaks clearly would have profound 
implications for the time available for mitigation.  
 
It is worth noting that the USGS mean estimate for the remaining recoverable 
world oil resource is much higher than estimates made by other investigators, 
according to K.S. Deffeyes, retired Shell geologist and emeritus Princeton 
geology professor.121  Deffeyes also opined “… in 2000 the USGS again 
released implausibly large estimates of world oil.”  A lower total reserves 
estimate would of course mean a world oil production peak earlier than 2016. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
120 DOE EIA. "Long Term World Oil Supply."  April 18, 2000. 
121 Deffeyes, K.S.  Hubbert’s Peak-The Impending World Oil Shortage.  Princeton University 
Press. 2003.  p. 134. 
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Figure A-1.  Two EIA oil production scenarios based on expected ultimate 
world-recoverable oil of 3,003 billion barrels and a 2 percent annual world 
oil demand escalation 
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APPENDIX II.  MORE HISTORICAL OIL CRISIS CONSIDERTIONS  
 
Economists have debated whether the economic problems of the 1970s were 
due to the oil supply disruptions or to inappropriate fiscal, monetary, and energy 
policies implemented to deal with them.  The consensus is that the disruptions 
would have caused economic problems irrespective of fiscal, monetary, and 
energy policies, but that price and allocation controls exacerbated the impacts in 
the U.S. during the 1970s.122  There is general consensus on the following: 
 
• Appropriate actions taken included CAFE, the 55 mph speed limit, 
reorganization of the Federal energy bureaucracy, greatly 
increased energy R&D, establishment of the Strategic Petroleum 
Reserve (SPR), energy efficiency standards and building codes, 
establishment of IEA and EIA, and burden sharing agreements 
among nations. 
• Inadvisable actions included price and allocation controls, 
excessive regulations, de-facto gasoline rationing, “excess profits” 
taxes, policies targeting “greedy energy companies,” prohibitions on 
energy use, and subsidy programs. 
• Some actions that seemed to be inappropriate may have been 
desirable if the problem had not been short-lived.  For example, 
synthetic fuel initiatives may have looked prescient had oil prices 
not collapsed in the mid 1980s.123 
 
Estimated costs to the U.S. of oil supply disruptions range from $25 billion to $75 
billion per year, and the cumulative costs since 1973-74 total about $4 trillion.124  
Nevertheless, except for several serious disruptions (and then only temporarily), 
oil prices have risen little in real terms over the past century, as shown in Figure 
A-2. 
 
Cost of living adjustment clauses imbedded in many contracts, labor agreements, 
and government programs (e.g., Social Security) are less visible but important 
inflation drivers.  Price increases generated by oil supply disruptions 
automatically trigger successive inflationary adjustments throughout the  
 
                                                
122This consensus emerged by the 1990s; see, for example, K. Lee, S. Ni, and R. Ratti, “Oil 
Shocks and the Macroeconomy:  The Role of Price Variability," Energy Journal, Vol. 16, no. 4, 
1995. 
123Once again, this experience may preclude such an option in the future, even though it may be 
called for.  For example, by the 1990s, CBO had concluded that the threat posed by oil 
disruptions had declined; see U.S. Congressional Budget Office, op. cit. 
124Estimates range from $2 trillion to more than $7 trillion (2004 dollars) -- exclusive of military or 
political costs.  See U.S. General Accounting Office, Energy Security:  Evaluating U.S. 
Vulnerability To Oil Supply Disruptions and Options for Mitigating Their Effects, GAO/RCED-97-6, 
1997; David Greene and Nataliya Tishchishyna, Cost of Oil Dependence:  A 2000 Update, Oak 
Ridge National Laboratory, May 2000; National Defense Council Foundation, The Hidden Cost of 
Imported Oil, October 2003. 
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Figure A-2.  Oil Prices in Current and Constant Dollars:  1900 - 2004 
 
economy, and these complicate monetary policies designed to counter the 
inflationary effects of the disruption.125 
 
The U.S. is currently less oil-dependent (in terms of oil / GDP ratios) than during 
the 1970s.  However, as shown in Figure A-3, the U.S. is now importing twice as 
much oil (in percentage terms) as 30 years ago and its transportation sector 
consumes a larger portion of total oil consumption.126  Further, by 2000 most of 
the energy saving trends resulting from the 1970s disruptions (increased energy 
efficiency and conservation, increased vehicle mpg, etc.) had been captured. 
 
The primary effect of the 1973-74 disruption was oil price increases.  As shown in 
Figure A-2, the real price of oil peaked in 1981 and has never again reached 
similar levels. 
 
At present, oil would have to be nearly $80 per barrel and gasoline would have 
exceed $3 per gallon to equal real 1981 prices.  Even then, however, energy 
would still be less significant factor in the U.S. economy because average U.S. 
per capita incomes have doubled since 1981 and energy is a much smaller 
component of expenditures127. 
                                                
125 See the discussion in Roger Bezdek and John Taylor, “Allocating Petroleum Products During 
Oil Supply Disruptions,” Science, June 19, 1981, Vol. 212, pp. 1357-1363. 
126 DOE, EIA Monthly Energy Review and Management Information Services, Inc., 2004 
127In 1981, consumers spent nearly six percent of their incomes on gasoline, but in 2003 they 
spent only three percent of their incomes on gasoline; in 1985, gasoline and oil represented 20 
percent of the cost of owning and operating a vehicle, but by 2002 represented only 10 percent of 
the cost. 
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Nevertheless, over the past 20 years, oil prices have been extremely volatile – 
more volatile than virtually any other commodity.128 
 
 
Figure A-3.  U.S. Oil Imports and Transportation Shares of Oil Consumption, 1973 
and 2003 
 
                                                
128Between 1982 and 2002, the standard deviation in monthly oil prices was 29.5 percent of its 
mean, and the only other major commodity whose price exhibited similar volatility was coffee – 
27.8 percent of its mean.  See Andre Plourde and G.C. Watkins, “Crude Oil Prices Between 1985 
and 1994:  How Volatile in Relation to Other Commodities?” Resource and Energy Economics, 
Vol. 20, 1998, pp. 245-262.  In general, Plourde and Watkins found that oil prices fluctuated more 
or at least much as the most volatile of commodity prices; see the discussion in Hillard 
Huntington, “Energy Disruptions, Interfirm Price Effects, and the Aggregate Economy,” Stanford 
Energy Modeling Forum, September 2002.  
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APPENDIX III.  LIKELY FUTURE OIL DEMAND 
 
Petroleum consumption has been inexorably linked to population growth, 
industrial development, and economic growth for the past century. This 
relationship is expected to continue worldwide for the foreseeable future. While 
the U.S. consumes more oil than any other country – about 20 MM bpd, it 
represents only 26 percent of world production, compared to the 46 percent of 
world oil production the U.S. consumed in 1960.  As shown in Figure A-4, 
Western Europe currently consumes the second largest amount (18 percent) 
followed by Japan (7 percent), China (6 percent), and the FSU (5 percent), with 
over 150 other countries accounting for the remaining 38 percent of 
production.129 
 
 
Figure A-4.  World Petroleum Consumption, 1960-2025 
 
Energy forecasting is difficult due to the numerous complex factors that influence 
energy supply and demand.130 Here we utilize the U.S. Energy Department's 
Energy Information Administration forecasts of future world oil requirements. 
                                                
129 DOE EIA, International Energy Outlook, 2004. 
130 See the discussion in Roger H. Bezdek and Robert M. Wendling, "A Half-Century of Long-
Range Energy Forecasts; Errors Made, Lessons Learned, and Implications for Forecasting," 
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Table A-1 presents summary statistics for the EIA 2001-2025 forecast including 
24-year country or country group projections for petroleum consumption, gross 
domestic product (GDP), and population.   
 
Table A-1. 
Reference Case Projections, 2001-2025 
(Average annual % change)131 
 
 Petroleum GDP  
  Consumption (Con. $) Population 
    
U.S. 1.5 3.0 0.8 
W.Europe 0.5 2.0 0.1 
China 4.0 6.1 0.5 
FSU 2.1 4.2 -0.2 
Japan 0.3 1.7 -0.1 
Other 2.0 4.0 1.3 
World 1.9 3.0 1.0 
 
Oil consumption in China is expected to increase 4 percent a year, and by 2025 
China is projected to be the second largest oil consuming country in the world, 
accounting for 11 percent of total world consumption.  The second fastest 
growing market is projected to be the FSU countries, where petroleum 
consumption is forecast to increase an average of over 2 percent per year.  
 
The remaining large consumers, including the U.S., Western Europe, and Japan 
are forecast to experience consumption growth over the 24-year period at or 
below the world average.  The U.S. is forecast to increase oil consumption at a 
rate of 1.5 percent per year, and by 2025 the U.S. share of world oil consumption 
is forecast to decline to 23 percent (29.7 MM bpd), while Western Europe's share 
decreases to 13 percent (14.4 MM bpd).  The many countries grouped as "Other" 
above, including India, Mexico, and Brazil, are expected to experience oil 
consumption growth rates 10 to 30 percent higher than the world average.  By 
2025, this group is forecast to account for 43 percent of world oil consumption.  
 
In sum, in the EIA reference case, world oil consumption of 80 MM bpd in 2003 is 
projected to increase to 121 MM bpd in 2025, with the most rapid increases 
occurring in nations other than the U.S., Japan, or those in Western Europe.  
Average annual world oil demand growth is projected as 1.9 percent over the 
period. 
 
 
 
 
                                                
131 Source:  U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration, 2004. 
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APPENDIX IV.   RATIONALES FOR THE WEDGES 
 
A.  Vehicle Fuel Efficiency  
 
The original U.S. Corporate Average Fuel Efficiency (CAFE) timetable, enacted 
in 1975, mandated a 53 percent increase in vehicle fuel efficiency, from 18 mpg 
to 27.5 mpg,  over the seven years between 1978 and 1985.   Average on-road 
vehicle fuel efficiency began to improve markedly in the early 1980s and 
continued to improve substantially every year through 1995.  It showed little 
change between 1995 and 1999, and then began to decline gradually due to the 
shift to greater purchases of light trucks and SUVs.  Between 1982 and 1995, 
average on-road vehicle fuel efficiency increased from about 14 mpg to 20 mpg.  
In other words, the first major U.S. oil disruption occurred in the fall of 1973; 
CAFE was not enacted until two years later; the increased mpg requirements did 
not begin until 1978, and were phased in through 1985; and significant increases 
in average on-road vehicle fuel efficiency did not occur until the mid- to late 
1980s.132 
 
From the time world oil peaking occurs or is recognized, it may thus take as long 
as 15 years until strengthened vehicle fuel efficiency standards significantly 
increase average on-road fleet fuel efficiency.  However, care must be exercised 
in making extrapolations. Most “realistic” enhanced vehicle fuel efficiency 
standards might not actually decrease future total gasoline consumed in the U.S. 
due to the anticipated continued increase in numbers of drivers and vehicles.  
Thus, a new CAFE mandate might decrease the rate at which future gasoline 
consumption increases, but not necessarily reduce total consumption.133  Only 
aggressive vehicle fuel efficiency standards legislation that “pushes the 
envelope” of fuel efficiency technologies over the next two decades (as 
determined, for example, in the study by the National Research Council of the 
National Academy of Sciences134) is likely to actually reduce total U.S. gasoline 
consumption.   
 
Savings in the U.S.  Assuming a crisis atmosphere, we hypothesize an 
aggressive vehicle fuel efficiency scenario, based on the NRC CAFE report and 
other studies that estimate the fuel efficiency gains possible from incremental 
technologies available or likely to be available within the next decade.135  We 
                                                
132Management Information Services, Inc., and 20/20 Vision, Fuel Standards and Jobs:  
Economic, Employment, Energy, and Environmental Impacts of Increased CAFE Standards 
Through 2020, report prepared for the Energy Foundation, San Francisco, California, July 2002. 
133Ibid. 
134National Research Council, National Academy of Sciences, Effectiveness and Impact of 
Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) Standards, Washington, D.C.:  National Academy 
Press, 2002. 
135Ibid. Management Information Services, Inc., and 20/20 Vision, op. cit.; David L. Greene and 
John DeCicco, Engineering-Economic Analysis of Automotive Fuel Economy Potential in the 
United States,  paper presented at the IEA International Workshop on Technologies to Reduce 
Greenhouse Gas Emissions, Washington, D.C., May 1999; David Friedman, et al, Drilling in 
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assume that legislation is enacted on the action date in each scenario.  We 
further assume that vehicle fuel efficiency standards are increased 30 percent 
three years later -- for cars from 27.5 mpg to 35.75 mpg and for light trucks from 
20.7 mpg to 26.9 -- and then increased to 50 percent above the base eight years 
later -- for cars from 27.5 mpg to 41.25 mpg and for light trucks from 20.7 mpg to 
31 mpg; finally, we assume full implementation is assumed 12 years after the 
legislation is enacted.  These assumptions  “push the envelope” on the fuel 
efficiency gains possible from current or impending technologies.136 
 
On the basis of our assumptions, the U.S. would save 500 thousand barrels per 
day of liquid fuels 10 ten years after legislation is enacted; 1.5 million barrels per 
day of liquid fuels at year 15; and 3 million barrels per day of liquid fuels at year 
20. 
 
Worldwide Savings. The U.S. currently has about 25 percent of total world 
vehicle registrations, but consumes nearly 40 percent of the liquid fuels used in 
transportation worldwide.137  Since we could not find credible forecasts of  the 
potential impacts of increased worldwide vehicle fuel efficiency standards, we 
assumed that the impact in the rest of the world of enhanced vehicle fuel 
efficiency standards will be about equal to that in the U.S.  In total, the worldwide 
impact of increased vehicle fuel efficiency standards   would thus yield a savings 
of 1 million barrels per day of liquid fuels 10 years after legislation is enacted; 3 
million barrels per day 15 years after legislation is enacted; and 6 million barrels 
per day 20 years after legislation is enacted. 
 
Increased vehicle fuel efficiency standards are a powerful way to reduce liquid 
fuels consumption.  However, they required long lead-times to enact, implement, 
and become effective in the past. On the other hand, their importance and 
contributions continue to grow over time as older vehicles are retired.  Our world 
                                                                                                                                            
Detroit: Tapping Automaker Ingenuity to Build Safe and Efficient Automobiles, Union of 
Concerned Scientists, UCS Publications, Cambridge, MA, June 2001; Roland Hwang, Bryanna 
Millis, and Theo Spencer, Clean Getaway:  Toward Safe and Efficient Vehicles, Natural 
Resources Defense Council: New York, July 2001; Brent D. Yacobucci, Sport Utility Vehicles, 
Mini-Vans and Light Trucks:  An Overview of Fuel Economy and Emissions Standards, 
Congressional Research Service, U.S. Congress: Washington, D.C., (RS20298), January 16, 
2001; Robert L Bamberger, Automobile and Light Truck Fuel Economy:  Is CAFE Up to 
Standards?  Washington, D.C.:  Congressional Research Service, September 29, 2001; Energy 
and Environmental Analysis, Inc.  Technology and Cost of Future Fuel Economy Improvements 
for Light-Duty Vehicles, prepared for the National Research Council, 2001.  
136See Management Information Services, Inc., and 20/20 Vision, op. cit.; Roger H. Bezdek and 
Robert M. Wendling, “The Economic and Employment Effects of Increasing CAFE Standards.”  
Energy Policy, 2004.   
137U.S. Energy Information Administration, World Petroleum Consumption by Fuel database, 
2003, and Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Transportation Energy Data Book, 2003.  Japan has 
10% of total vehicle registrations, Germany 9 percent, France 5 percent, and UK 5 percent, 
totaling (including the U.S.) 54 percent%.  However, the U.S. has a higher miles per vehicle rate 
than any other developed country – it is less densely populated, has relatively inexpensive 
gasoline, and U.S. drivers do a large amount of discretionary driving. 
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vehicle fuel efficiency wedge is assumed to be as follows: 
  
 
       Time - Years 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
We note that a detailed study of these issues and opportunities would be of great 
value.  
 
 
B.  Coal Liquids  
 
High quality liquid fuels can be made from coal via direct liquefaction or via 
gasification followed by Fisher-Tropsch synthesis.  A number of coal liquefaction 
plants were built and operated during World War II, and the Sasol Company in 
South Africa subsequently built a number of larger, more modern gasification-
based facilities.138 
 
While the first two Sasol coal liquids production plants were built under normal 
business conditions, the Sasol Three facility was designed and constructed on a 
crash basis in response to the Iranian revolution of 1978-79.  The project was 
completed in just over three years after the decision to proceed.  Sasol Three 
was essentially a duplicate of Sasol Two on the same site using a large cadre of 
experienced personnel.  Sasol Three was brought “up to speed almost 
immediately.”139 
 
The Sasol Three example represents the lower bound on what might be 
accomplished in a twenty-first century crash program to build coal liquefaction 
plants.  This is because the South African government made a quick decision to 
replicate an existing plant on an existing, coal mine-mouth site without the delays 
                                                
138 Kruger, P du P.  "Startup Experience at Sasol’s Two and Three."  Sasol.  1983. 
139 Collings, J.  "Mind Over Matter – The Sasol Story:  A Half-Century of Technological 
Innovation,"  Sasol.  2002. 
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associated with site selection, environmental reviews, public comment periods, 
etc.  In addition, engineering and construction personnel were readily available, 
and there were a number of manufacturers capable of providing the required 
heavy process vessels, pumps, and other auxiliary equipment.  While we have 
not done a survey of worldwide capabilities to perform similar tasks today, it is 
our belief that such capabilities are now in much shorter supply – a situation that 
will worsen dramatically with the advent of a worldwide crash program to build 
alternate fuels plants.  We have therefore attempted to strike a balance between 
what we believe could be a somewhat slow startup of a worldwide coal 
liquefaction industry and a later speed up as experience is gained and new 
plants are built as essentially duplicates of previous plants. 
 
Our coal liquefaction wedge thus assumes that the first coal liquefaction plants in 
a worldwide crash program would begin operation four years after a decision to 
proceed.  We assume plant sizes of 100,000 bpd of finished, refined product, and 
we assume that five such plants could be brought into operation each year.  We 
cannot predict where in the world these coal liquefaction plants might be built.  
Candidate countries with large coal reserves include the U.S. and the Former 
Soviet Union with the largest, followed in descending order by China, India and 
Australia.140  We note that a consortium of Chinese companies has recently 
signed a letter of intent with Sasol for feasibility studies on the construction of two 
new coal-to-liquids plans in China.141 
 
If U.S. siting and environmental reviews of new energy facilities were to continue 
to be as time consuming as they are today, few coal liquefaction plants would 
likely be built in the U.S.  On the other hand, China has been quick to approve 
major new facilities, so coal liquefaction plants in that country might well be built 
expeditiously and economically.  Because there is presently a large international 
trade in coal, it is not inconceivable that coal-poor counties might become the 
sites of many coal liquefaction plants using imported coal, possibly even from the 
U.S. 
 
Our coal liquefaction wedge then appears be as follows: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
140 DOE EIA.  International Energy Outlook.  2004. 
141 "Sasol Taps Into China’s Demand for Oil."  Financial Times.  July 8, 2004. 
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      Time – Years 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
C.  Heavy Oils / Oil Sands  
 
As noted, significant heavy oil production currently exists in Canada and 
Venezuela.  While their total resource is estimated to be 3-4 trillion barrels, 
recoverable oil reserves are estimated to be roughly 600 billion barrels.142  Such 
reserves could support a massive expansion in production of these 
unconventional oils.   
 
In the case of Canadian oil sands, a number of factors would challenge a crash 
program expansion, such as the need for massive supplies of auxiliary energy, 
huge land and water requirements, environmental management, and the harsh 
climate in the region.  In the case of Venezuela, large amounts of supplemental 
energy, inherently low well productivity and other factors will likely pose 
significant challenges. 
 
We know of no comprehensive analysis of how fast the Canadian and 
Venezuelan heavy oil production might be accelerated in a world suddenly short 
of conventional oil.  Recent statements by the World Energy Council (WEC) 
guided our wedge estimates:143 
 
• “Unconventional oil is unlikely to fill the gap (associated with conventional 
oil peaking).  Although the resource base is large and technological 
progress has been able to bring costs down to competitive levels, the 
dynamics do not suggest a rapid increase in supply but, rather, a long, 
slow growth over several decades.” 
                                                
142 Williams, B.  "Heavy Hydrocarbons Playing Key Role in Peak Oil Debate, Future Supply."  
OGJ.  July 28, 2003; DOE EIA.  Early Release AEO 2004.  December 16, 2003. 
143 "Drivers of the Energy Scene."  World Energy Council.  December 2003. 
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• “(Extrapolating expectations of TOTAL Oil Company in the Orinoco, 
Venezuela) overall reserves today would be only ~60 Gb over 30 years, 
allowing at best 6 MM bpd of production in 2030 if the entire area were put 
into production.” 
 
• “Current estimates put the additional production of Canada (heavy oil) … 
at less than 2 MM bpd in 2015-2025.” 
 
In line with the WEC, we assume the following for our Venezuelan Heavy Oils 
wedge: 
 
1. Accelerated production might begin three years after a decision to 
proceed with a crash program.  This delay is based on the fact that the 
country already has significant production underway.  Starting from 
scratch would require much more time.   
 
2. Under business-as-usual conditions assumed by the WEC, Venezuela 
would have production of 6 MM bpd in 2030 -- 5.5 MM bpd beyond 
production of 0.5 MM bpd in 2003.  If we assume this level of production is 
achieved 10 years after initiation of a crash program, rather than the 
roughly 25 years estimated by WEC, then roughly 5.5 MM bpd of 
incremental production might be achieved 13 years from a decision to 
accelerate.   
 
3. In contrast to the WEC, we assume that Venezuelan production is not 
capped at 6 MM bpd but continues to expand for the period covered by 
our approximations. Note:  We ignore the currently extremely unstable 
political environment in Venezuela and assume that scale-up timing is not 
hindered by local politics. 
 
Our assumptions for Canadian oil sands are as follows: 
 
1. Again, accelerated production might begin three years after a decision to 
proceed with a crash program, based in large part on the fact that the 
country already has significant production underway. 
 
2. Current plans are for production of 3 MM bpd of synthetic crude oil from 
which refined fuels can be produced by 2030.  This is above current 
production of 0.6 MM bpd.  If we assume this level of production is 
achieved 10 years after initiation of a crash program, rather than the 
roughly 25 years targeted by the Canadians, then roughly 2.5 MM bpd of 
incremental production might be achieved 13 years from a decision to 
accelerate.   
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3. aWe know of no upper limit on Canadian oil sands production, so for 
purposes of this order-of-magnitude illustration, we do not assume one. 
  
Our heavy oil wedge therefore is approximated as follows:  
 
       Time - Years 
 
              Canada 
 
 
          
          Venezuela 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
D.  Enhanced Oil Recovery 
 
Because it is impossible to evaluate the worldwide impact of Improved Oil 
Recovery (IOR) techniques, we can only provide a rough estimate of what might 
be achieved.  We focus on a major subset of IOR technologies – Enhanced Oil 
Recovery (EOR).  While EOR can add significantly to reserves, it is normally not 
applied to a conventional oil reservoir until after production has peaked.  As 
discussed earlier, the most widely applicable EOR process involves the injection 
of CO2 into conventional oil reservoirs to dissolve and move residual oil.  
Because EOR processes require extensive planning, large capital expenditures, 
procurement of very large volumes of CO2, and major equipment for large 
reservoirs, our simplified assumptions parallel those for our heavy oil and coal 
liquids wedges.   
 
We assume that the massive application of EOR worldwide will not begin to show 
production enhancement until 5 years after the peaking of world oil production, 
paced primarily by the difficulties of procuring CO2.  We further assume that 
world oil production enhancement due to such a crash effort worldwide will 
increase world oil production by roughly 3 percent after 10 years.144  We translate 
                                                
144Even under a crash program, 5 percent production increase in 10 years does not seem 
achievable, but roughly half that level might be possible.  Our reasoning is strongly influenced by 
the need for relatively pure CO2, which is difficult to obtain in most places around the world.  This 
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the 3 percent to 3 MM bpd, based on our assumed world oil peaking level of 
roughly 100 MM bpd.  Our EOR wedge thus appears as follows: 
 
 
 
               Time - Years 
 
 
 
 
            
 
          
           
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
E.  Gas-To-Liquids 
 
Estimating how fast world Gas-To-Liquids (GTL) production might grow as a 
result of the peaking of world oil production is an extremely complex undertaking 
because of the need to consider the total world energy system, its likely growth 
by country, future energy economics, other resources that compete with natural 
gas, etc.  In a crash program, GTL plants might be built in a number of counties 
that have large reserves of stranded gas..  Once operational, GTL product could 
be moved to markets around the world by conventional oil product tankers. 
 
Our estimates for a crash program of world GTL production are tempered by the 
conflicting world demand for Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG), whose export volumes 
are currently growing at a rapid pace.  The tradeoffs involved in estimating the 
future LNG / GTL balance are complex, and a world crash program in GTL could 
yield higher or lower volumes than our estimates. Note also that seven countries 
currently account for almost 80 percent of the world gas export market, and it is 
not inconceivable that the recently formed Gas Exporting Countries Forum 
(GECF) might well evolve into a future OPEC-like cartel.145 
 
                                                                                                                                            
is especially true in the Middle East, where large sources of relatively pure CO2 are somewhat 
rare at this time. 
145 McCaughey, J.  "Is Gas OPEC in the Cards?"  Electricity Daily.  June 29, 2004. 
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Again, we assume a startup delay of three years before crash program GTL 
plants might come into operation.  Using a base case, business-as-usual 
production forecast of 1.0 MM bpd in 2015 from the current level of essentially 
zero, we assume that a crash program might yield the 1.0 MM bpd in 5 years.  
The resultant wedge might then be as follows: 
 
               Time - Years 
 
 
 
 
            
 
          
           
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
F.  Sum of the  Wedges 
 
A summary of the estimates from the foregoing is presented in Table A-2. 
 
Table A-2. 
Summary of Consumption and Production Wedge Estimates 
 
 
              DELAY UNTIL      IMPACT 10 YEARS  
     CATEGORY         FIRST IMPACT           LATER  
                       (Years)         (MM bpd)  
 
Vehicle Efficiency           3      3 
 
Gas-To-Liquids          3      2 
 
Heavy Oils / Oil Sands         3      8 
 
Coal Liquids                  4      5 
 
Enhanced Oil Recovery         5      3 
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Ordering the various contributions by their starting dates, the total mitigation 
wedge is as shown in Figure A-5. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
            
 
          
           
  
 
 
Figure A-5.  The total of the wedge estimates 
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APPENDIX V.  NOTES ON SHALE OIL AND BIOMASS 
  
A.  Oil Shale by Gilbert McGurl, NETL 
 
Worldwide resources of oil shale comprise an estimated 2.6 trillion barrels, of 
which two trillion are located within the United States. The richest deposits, 1.5 
trillion bbl with high concentrations of kerogen, lie in Colorado, Utah, and 
Wyoming.  An additional 16 billion barrels of rich but physically different oil shale 
is found in Kentucky, Indiana, and Ohio.  A recent estimate is that, from the 
Green River deposits, 130 billion barrels of oil may be produced.  Technology 
development on oil shale ‘retorting’ reached a high point in the late 1970s, with 
the major oil companies leading the way.  The oil price collapse of the 1980s, the 
dissolution of the synfuels program, and the termination of the Unocal project in 
1991 led to the demise of oil shale production in the United States. 
 
A recent study performed by the DOE Office of Naval Petroleum and Oil Shale 
Reserves advocates a research and development program with a production 
goal of two million barrels per day by 2020.146  Production would be initiated by 
2011.  Traditional technologies for mining and preparation of oil shale ores and 
for aboveground upgrading have been ‘proven’ at less-than-commercial scale.  
Newer Canadian technologies have been tested at demonstration projects in 
Australia.  However, that project, the Stuart upgrading project, is currently 
suspended pending project re-design.  Nonetheless, the same technology has 
been licensed by operators in Estonia.  Technologies for in-situ recovery are 
newer and less developed.  In 2000, Shell revived an oil shale project called 
“Mahogany” in Colorado.147  Shell aims to test its process until 2010. If 
successful, the in-situ method would leave heavier hydrocarbons in the shale 
while producing lighter hydrocarbons and using much less water than traditional 
methods. 
 
Most Estonian processing of oil shale has been for boiler fuel for electricity 
production.  Small liquids facilities have been operating at “full capacity” given 
recent market oil prices.  There are no solid figures for cost in large-scale plants 
since none have been built.  The aborted Australian project estimated $8.50/bbl 
in operating costs once a commercial plant had been built. The Estonians 
estimate a break-even point at $21 Brent price (app $23 WTI) and low capacity 
factor. At higher capacity factors, plants may operate profitably even with prices 
in the mid-teens. 
 
Besides water use and production, environmental concerns include fine 
particulates and carbon dioxide emissions.  Since the last US oil shale project 
                                                
146 US DOE ONPOSR.  Strategic Significance of America’s Oil Shale, Vols I and II. March 2004. 
147 Rocky Mountain News, October 18, 2004, “Shale’s New Hope: Shell Tests Technology to 
Cook Oil out of Rocks Underground,” p. 1B. 
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ceased operation before the implementation of the 1990 Clean Air Act 
amendments, new emission-control equipment would need to be tested on US 
shales.   
 
 
B.  Biofuels by Peter Balash, NETL 
 
Bioethanol is produced as a transportation fuel largely in only two countries. In 
2003 the US produced about 2.8 billion gallons and Brazil produced 3.5 billion 
gallons. All of this ethanol is produced by conversion of starch to sugar and 
fermentation to ethanol. In the US ethanol represents about 1.4% of the BTU 
content (2.0% by volume) of gasoline used in transportation. Current costs for 
ethanol production in the US are said to be $0.90 per gallon,148 which is 
equivalent to a gasoline price of $1.35 per gallon. Because of recent increases in 
energy costs current costs will be somewhat higher. Grain ethanol provides only 
a modest net energy gain because of the energy required to produce it. USDA 
calculated a net energy gain of 34% for a modern corn to ethanol plant,149 but 
there is considerable controversy over the real efficiency of the process. Most of 
the energy used to produce ethanol comes from natural gas and electricity. The 
production of ethanol uses only about 5% of the corn crop in the US. Significant 
expansion is possible but at some point there might be an impact on food prices. 
 
Cellulosic ethanol is currently being produced only in two rather small pilot plants 
but is capable of producing about 40% conversion of cellulosic biomass to 
ethanol while providing all the energy needed for the process and exporting a 
modest amount of energy as electricity. It is anticipated that successful research 
may reduce the cost of cellulosic ethanol to about $1.10 per gallon by 2010. If 
this occurs the potential ethanol to mitigate peaking is high. Using only waste 
biomass and grass grown on land currently in the conservation reserve could 
produce 50 billion gallons of ethanol which would be equivalent to 35 billion 
gallons of gasoline or 17% of current US consumption. This could be achieved 
without any impact on current food production and at prices only $ 0.35 per 
gallon higher than refinery prices for gasoline. Since ethanol has an RON of 130 
and a MON of 96 it raises the octane of the gasoline to which it is added and has 
a premium value as a result. 
 
 
                                                
148 NREL 2002. 
149 USDA 2002. 
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APPENDIX VI: AREAS FOR FURTHER STUDY 
 
1. Economic Benefits to the U.S. Associated With an Aggressive 
Mitigation Initiative  
 
Important economic and jobs benefits could result from a concerted U.S. 
effort to develop substitute fuels plants based on U.S. coal and shale 
resources and scale up of EOR.  The impacts might include hundreds of 
billions of dollars of investment, hundreds of thousands of jobs, a rejuvenation 
of various domestic industries, and increased tax revenues for the Federal, 
state, and local governments.  The identification and analysis of such benefits 
require analysis. 
 
In the short run, the U.S would be hard-pressed to find adequate physical and 
human resources to plan, develop, construct, and operate the required 
facilities.  Given that oil peaking is a world problem, it is virtually certain that at 
the same time the U.S. embarked on an aggressive mitigation program, other 
major initiatives would likely be undertaken elsewhere in the world.  All would 
require similar types of capital, technology, and human resources, generating 
additional constraints and inflationary pressures on the U.S. program.  
Assessment of the impacts of these constraints on the feasibility, costs, and 
timing of a major U.S. mitigation program merits investigation.  
 
2. Oil Peaking Risk Analysis:  Cost of Premature Mitigation versus 
Waiting 
 
The date of world oil production peaking is unknowable, but it may occur in 
the not too distant future.  Large-scale mitigation is needed more than a 
decade before the onset of peaking if economic hardship is to be avoided.  If 
major efforts were initiated early and peaking was to occur decades later, 
there might be an unproductive use of resources.  On the other hand, 
mitigation initiated at the time of peaking will not spare the world from a 
decade or more of devastating economic impacts.  A careful analysis of the 
benefits / costs of early versus late mitigation could provide valuable insights. 
 
3.  U.S. Natural Gas Production as a Paradigm for Viewing World Oil 
Peaking 
 
The history of U.S. natural gas production is cited as an example of the perils 
of over-optimistic resource forecasts.  A detailed analysis of the North 
American natural gas history, status, and outlook might provide lessons 
useful in addressing world oil production peaking. 
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4.  Potential for Non-transportation Oil Fuel-Switching 
 
World non-transportation liquid fuel usage is amenable to fuel switching, 
thereby freeing up liquids for transportation.  If switching were to occur on a 
large-scale, it would likely take place gradually because other energy 
substitutes would have to be scaled up to meet the new demands associated 
with a major shift, e.g., electric power plants built, refineries expanded to 
produce a different product slate, etc.  A detailed study would provide an 
understanding of how difficult, expensive, time-consuming and productive 
worldwide non-transportation fuel switching might be. 
 
5.   World Coal-To- Liquids Potential 
 
Sasol has operational coal-to-liquids (CTL) production plants and is under 
contract to study the construction of similar facilities in China. An analysis of 
worldwide large-scale CTL potential could yield a useful estimate of 
complexity, timing and potential. 
 
6. World Heavy Oil / Oil Sands Potential 
 
Canada, Venezuela, and, to a lesser degree, other countries have potential to 
massively scale up their unconventional oil production.  A better 
understanding of how quickly scale-up might be implemented, the related 
barriers, and ultimate potential would help in the understanding the potential 
contribution of these resources. 
 
7. World EOR Potential 
 
An analysis of worldwide large-scale EOR potential could provide an estimate 
of complexity, timing and potential. 
 
8. World GTL Potential 
 
An analysis of worldwide large-scale GTL potential could yield a useful 
estimate of complexity, timing and potential.  In particular, the likely conflicts 
between GTL and LNG production could provide a quantitative estimate of 
likely future use of world stranded gas. 
 
9. World Transportation Fuel Efficiency Improvement Potential  
 
It is important that we have the best possible understanding of the U.S. and 
worldwide potential for the upgrading of transportation fuel efficiency, 
including possible timing, cost, and savings as a function of time. Excellent 
data is available on U.S. transportation fleets, but fleets elsewhere in the 
world are less well described.  A careful study is needed. 
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10. Impacts of Oil Prices and Technology on U.S. Lower 48 Oil 
Production 
 
Analysis of U.S. Lower 48 oil production since the 1970 peak strongly 
suggests that oil prices and advancing technology had little impact on the 
production decline.  However, a number of institutional factors also impacted 
Lower 48 oil production, e.g., allowables (Texas Railroad Commission), price 
and allocation controls (1970s), free market pricing (since 1981), foreign 
opportunities for multi-national oil companies, etc.   An in-depth 
understanding of these various influences might provide useful guidance for 
the future.  
 
11. Technological Options for Coal Liquefaction 
 
Current world coal liquefaction R & D is focused on gasification of coal 
followed by the Fischer-Tropsch synthesis. Other coal-to-liquids processes 
have been proposed, some of which were tested at relatively large scale. It 
may be worthwhile to revisit the various options in light of today’s technology 
and environmental requirements to determine if any of them might also have 
competitive potential.  
 
12. Performance of Oil Provinces Outside of the U.S. 
 
There is a strong rationale for using U.S Lower 48 oil production as a 
surrogate pattern for future world oil production peaking and decline.  Other 
large oil province histories could also yield valuable insights and alternate 
patterns.  Related analysis might provide an improved basis for modeling 
future world oil production. 
 
13. How the U.S. Could Again Become the World’s Largest Oil Producer.  
 
After the peaking of world conventional oil production, there will be a major 
world transition from the current world liquid fuel infrastructure.  Over time, 
major conservation and energy switching initiatives will almost certainly be 
implemented, but the need for liquid fuels will not disappear for at least the 
remainder of this century because there are no known alternatives for a 
number of transportation applications.  An analysis of the major factors 
required for the U.S. to return to a position of oil supremacy and oil 
independence would be enlightening. 
 
14. Market Signals in Advance of Peaking 
 
Increases in oil prices and oil price volatility have been identified as two 
precursors of world oil peaking, but both are likely short-term signals. The 
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identification and character of longer-term signals, if they exist, could be of 
significant value. 
 
15. Risk of Repeating the Synthetic Fuels Experience of 1970s and 1980s 
 
One risk of embarking on aggressive oil peaking mitigation is that OPEC 
might undermine such efforts by dramatically increasing conventional oil 
production. This could only happen if excess capacity were to exist, which 
could happen if world oil peaking was many decades away.  Were such a 
dramatic increase in OPEC production to occur, governments would be under 
pressure to terminate support for their mitigation programs.  Related 
scenarios might worthy of study. 
 
16. Effects of Oil Price Spikes in Causing U.S. Recessions 
 
Oil price spike have been followed by U.S. recessions, but they are not the 
only cause of recessions. A detailed study of the role of oil prices and other 
factors in causing recessions might be worth further study. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
